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P r e f a c e  
 
 
Real empirical work is question-driven. This is what I learned from 
doctoral lectures in graduate school when I was in U.S.A. The motivation of doing 
empirical work can be many-fold: evaluating public policy, testing an economic 
theory, estimating a parameter of interest, understanding the micro-behaviour of 
agents or macro-behaviour of an economy, etc.  
The primary focus of this thesis is to explore socially and economically 
relevant questions. It contains three independent essays in empirical economics. 
Chapter One investigates single mothers’ labour force participation from a 
random experiment in U.S.A. Chapter Two examines the social factors behind the 
holding of life insurance in Germany. Chapter Three studies the effect of self-
reported health on the purchase of supplementary health insurance in Germany. 
All three essays deal intensely with empirical datasets and econometric models. 
 
Chapter One is my starting point in empirical work, which piqued my 
interest in empirical economics. After reading a paper by Grogger and 
Michalopoulos (2003), which studied the effect of time limits on welfare use with 
data from Florida’s Family Transition Program, a thought jumped into my mind 
that there might be more to be explored with this randomized dataset. I started to 
study the background of Florida’s Family Transition Program and tried to find a 
research topic out of it. The talks with my thesis advisor gave me the idea to 
examine single mothers’ labour force participation under the program effect. 
Evaluation techniques are applied to identify the effect. I analyze the probability 
of being employed and then estimate the conditional probability of exit from 
unemployment into different employment states with a discrete time proportional 
hazard model. The main finding is that, though the program has generated certain 
gains in employment in the middle of the study period, these gains diminished at 
the end of the follow-up period. The results from the hazard model indicated that 
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the program effect on exit from unemployment is also not significant after 
controlling for observed characteristics and unobserved heterogeneity. 
Chapter Two focuses on the social factors behind holdings of life 
insurance in Germany. Since I lived in Germany, my husband and I paid a 
monthly life insurance premium to a private health insurance company. As I 
realized that life insurance is an important part of private household saving in 
Germany, this topic became important to me. With a nation-wide representative 
dataset from German Social Economic Panel Studies, I examined the 
consequences of change of family structure, change in labour force participation 
and change in tax code on life insurance holdings. Chapter Two shows that the 
bequest motives are quite strong among families with dependent children, being 
unemployment has significant negative effect and higher tax code is related to 
higher probability of life insurance holdings due to incentives from German tax 
system. Since tax benefits of life insurance was abolished at the end of 2004, I 
evaluate the program anticipation effect using the same dataset and it shows that 
people responded positively to the program change with a higher probability of 
purchase. 
Chapter Three studies risk selection in private health insurance market in 
providing supplementary contracts. This study was inspired by some casual talks 
with people working in the insurance business about patients’ data protection. I 
learned a story about one person who hid information about his previous in-
patient treatment, causing his insurance company to cancel the supplementary 
contract with him. I started working on this research project with the data from 
German Social Economic Panel Studies to find out whether there exists risk 
selection in private health insurance market for supplementary coverage. The 
main explanatory variable is self-reported health status. After controlling for 
measurement error in this variable, the results show that bad health is related to a 
lower probability of purchasing a supplementary contract, other things being 
equal. The health insurance companies, through its risk selection procedure, 
insure only good risks and exclude bad risks. The evidence of risk selection 
provides some guidelines for policy discussions about patients’ data protection.  
 
IX 
 
While I was working on these three essays, I was brought into a world of 
empirical econometrics. From the discrete time proportional hazard model in the 
first essay to a panel probit model correcting for auto-correlated errors in the 
second essay, and to a two-equation system controlling for measurement error and 
a Heckman selection model in the third essay, I am amazed at the fact that 
econometric models can be such a powerful tool for empirical research. Yet there 
are more to be learned and there are more empirical questions to be answered. 
This thesis is my start.  
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C h a p t e r  O n e  
 
 
 
 
From Welfare to Work: 
Has Florida’s Family Transition Program  
Reduced Unemployment? 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
This chapter studies the effect of Florida’s Family Transition Program 
(FTP) on single mothers’ labour force participation. As a pilot 
program implemented 2 years prior to establishment of national wide 
TANF welfare program that is currently in operation, the FTP 
program provided an important test case of the new law. I use the 4-
year administrative data from the FTP program and find that the FTP 
program had generated some impact on the labour force participation, 
especially on being full-time employed. However, the employment 
gains are mainly concentrated in the middle of the study period. 
Moreover, the estimation from a discrete time proportional hazard 
model with unobserved heterogeneity shows that the FTP program is 
statistically insignificant in speeding up the exit from unemployment 
to take the first available job since the random assignment.  
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I: Introduction: 
 
Over the years, the objectives of welfare reform have been to reduce 
dependency and promote work while still alleviating needs. In 1996, the passage 
of the law "The Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation 
Act” (PRWORA) replaced AFDC (Aid to Families with Dependent Children) 
with TANF (Temporary Aid to Needy Families). The establishment of RRWORA 
has been seen as part of the federal effort to ‘end welfare as we know it’ under 
Clinton Administration. These reforms are significant in American welfare policy 
as they changed benefit structure, introduced time limits on the receipt of benefits, 
strengthened requirements for mandatory participation in work-related activities, 
and changed various administrative procedures. 
Not only have important changes in welfare programs been observed in 
the last decade, but also remarkable welfare-related outcomes. According to a 
synthesis conducted by RAND, the welfare caseload fell to approximately 2.1 
million families as of September 2001, less than half its all-time peak level of 5.0 
million families in 1994; the fraction of welfare recipients participating in 
welfare-to-work activities or working increased rapidly; the employment rates and 
earnings of single mothers rose substantially; family income increased and the 
poverty rates declined. Meanwhile, the upward trend of non-marital fertility rate 
has levelled off.  
There has been great research effort devoted to understanding the effect of 
TANF prior to and after its implementation. The effects of welfare reform as a 
whole have been found to substantially reduce the welfare caseload and it seems 
likely that welfare reform is responsible for a portion of an increase in work and 
earnings among single mothers during the last decade. However, the studies of the 
depth of the impact are confounded by contemporaneous policy changes such as 
increases in the Earned Income Tax Credit (EITC), expansion of subsidized health 
insurance de-linked from welfare receipt, and increases in minimum wages that 
took place during the same time, and the long robust economics expansion in last 
decade. The imposition of time limits by TANF is believed by many researchers 
to have exerted great impact on the reduction of welfare caseloads and thus it 
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became the most broadly studied subject. The effect of time limits has been 
considered in research such as the Council of Economic Advisers (1997, 1999), 
Swann (1998), Moffitt (1999), and Ziliak et al. (2000). The study of the effects of 
time limits is not only confounded by the contemporaneous policy changes and 
the favourable economic growth as mentioned above but also the other policy 
components of TANF such as financial incentives, mandatory work-related 
activities and parental responsibilities.  
This chapter explores the data from a randomized experiment, Florida’s 
Family Transition Program (FTP), that is conducted in Escambia county in 
Florida to study the overall program impact on the labour force participation of 
single mothers. Some previous studies of the FTP program include Bloom et al. 
(2000), Grogger and Michalopoulos (1999, 2003), etc. 
 The empirical analysis in this chapter is composed of two parts: the 
analysis of probability of being employed and the estimation of the hazard rate of 
exit from unemployment. For the first part I classify the employment status 
according to their quarterly earning statistics as follows: irregularly part-time 
employment, part-time employment, full-time employment1. I then examine the 
employment probability over a 16-quarter period after the random assignment. 
For the second part, a discrete time proportional hazard model is applied to study 
the conditional probability of exit from unemployment into three different 
employment states.  
The FTP program has generated certain gains in employment in the middle 
of the studying period, especially in part-time and full-time employment. For part-
time employment, there is an apparent and consistent gap up to the 10th quarter 
between these two groups but at the end the gap becomes indistinguishable 
afterwards. The probabilities of full-time employment are increasing for both 
groups over the 16 quarters and the differences between these two groups become 
apparent and stable after the 2nd quarter. However, at the end of the follow-up 
period, the difference diminished and the AFDC group caught up. FTP’s results 
                                                 
1 Employment status classification I used is different from Bloom et al. (2000) in which they 
simply defines the outcome variable, employment, as non-zero earnings. 
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were affected by the unusual environment in which it was operated — a period of 
low unemployment, highly publicized changes in state and national welfare 
policies, and an unprecedented 70 percent decline in Florida’s welfare caseload. 
The expectation of the AFDC group was that they would join the new program 
after the study period motivated them to somehow be more active in the labour 
market participation, which helps to illustrate why there was little room left for 
FTP to generate large impacts at the end of the study period.  
The results from the hazard model indicate that the program effect on exit 
from unemployment, after controlling for observed characteristics and unobserved 
heterogeneity, is also not significant. Assigning the single mothers who were 
being unemployed to the FTP program did not accelerate their job take-up rates. 
As the hazard model studies the single unemployment spell during which the 
random assignment happened, the fact that the single mothers exited and entered 
unemployment more than once is not considered.  The insignificant program 
impact on picking up a first job after random assignment is not unexpected. As the 
FTP program offered some valuable services such as job training, the single 
mothers assigned to the program would find it more interesting to stay in the 
program and take advantage of these services in the short term, regardless of the 
financial incentives and mandatory working-hour requirements.  
Section II of this chapter provides background on the FTP data and some 
descriptive statistics. Section III discussed how I use the information from the 
original dataset to re-define the employment status. Section IV analyzes the 
employment probabilities over the 16 quarters after the random assignment. 
Section V presents a discrete time proportional hazard model with unobserved 
heterogeneity and the estimates. Section VI concludes.  
 
II. Data 
A. Background 
Florida’s Family Transition Program (FTP) was created by the Florida 
legislature and provides a useful tool to study the confounded effect of the welfare 
reform. It operated from 1994 through 1999 as a pilot program in Escambia 
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County (Pensacola) in Florida under waivers of pre-1996 welfare rules. It 
anticipated key elements of the federal law-- time limits on cash assistance receipt, 
financial incentives, together with an array of services and supports. For this 
reason — and because Escambia was the first place in the U.S where people 
reached a time limit and actually had their benefits cancelled — FTP was an 
important test case for states and localities across the country2.  
Starting from May 1994, all welfare recipients in Escambia County were 
randomized into one of two groups: the treatment group or the control group3. 
New entrants were randomized at the time they applied for benefits while ongoing 
recipients were randomized at the time of their semi-annual re-certification 
interviews. The treatment group was subjected to FTP policy reforms that include 
time limits, financial work incentives, and mandatory work-related activities. The 
control group was enrolled under the traditional AFDC program, where welfare 
benefits were an entitlement so that all poor single-parent families with at least 
one child under 18 years of age were eligible to receive aid4. People were assigned 
to the FTP and AFDC groups from May 1994 through October19965.  
The policy components in FTP and AFDC can be summarized in 
Appendix 1. The three main categories of reforms from Appendix 1 are: time 
limits, financial work incentives, and enhanced welfare-to-work services. FTP 
families faced a 24-month time limit in any 60-month period. Particularly 
disadvantaged families (about 53 percent of the sample) received a 36-month time 
                                                 
2 However, Florida’s current statewide welfare program includes similar time limits and financial 
work incentives, but differs from FTP in other key respects2; thus, the evaluation is not 
necessarily assessing the state’s current program. 
3 The randomization process was conducted by a computer program. It does not depend on the 
asset information. Exemptions from random assignment are given to those who are disabled, or 
older than 62 years old, or under 18 years old school attendants.  
4. Although the Work and Gain Economic Self-Sufficiency (WAGES) program replaced AFDC 
state wide in Florida in late 1996, to facilitate completing the study, both FTP and traditional 
AFDC continued to operate in Escambia County until late 1999. FTP officially ended on 
December 1, 1999, when individuals in the FTP and AFDC groups became subject to WAGES 
rules. However, distinction between the groups began to blur in September 1999, when AFDC 
group members were informed that they would become subject to WAGES in December. 
5. Beginning in October 1996, new applicants for welfare in Escambia County who had not 
already been assigned to the FTP group or the AFDC group were placed into WAGES. 
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limit in any 72-month period6. After that, their benefit could be cancelled. Overall, 
about 21 percent of the FTP group received at least as many months of benefit as 
their time limit allowed and the others left welfare before reaching their time limit. 
AFDC families faced no time limits. They were entitled to benefit receipt as long 
as they have a child under 18 years old. 
FTP families enjoyed relatively generous financial incentives as well. The 
first $200 of monthly earnings was disregarded from income in determining their 
monthly benefits, and earnings in excess of $200 were subject to a benefit 
reduction rate, or tax rate, of 50 percent. ADFC families faced the conventional 
financial incentives, which were less generous. The disregarded amount of 
earning not only is less than for FTP families but also decreases with the length of 
time. The benefit reduction rate is 100 percent. FTP participants received 
subsidized transitional childcare for two years after leaving welfare for work, as 
opposed to the one year provided under prior rules. These financial incentives 
clearly provided FTP families motivation from welfare to work.  
 Both FTP and AFDC families were required to spend 30 hours per week in 
mandatory work-related activities. The exemptions applied only to mothers with 
infants under 6 months of age under FTP. Under AFDC, the exemptions applied 
to mothers with children under 3 years old. FTP participants were also more likely 
than AFDC group members to be required to participate in employment-related 
activities, and the program developed some enhanced education, training, and job 
placement assistance services. To the extent that FTP’s enhanced services were 
valuable and were tied to welfare, some FTP families might postpone the working 
decision to accumulate more human capitals.  
 The data analyzed in this chapter comes mainly from the combined data 
file of administrative records and a short survey instrument known as the 
Background Information Form. The administrative records tracks the welfare 
receipt, earning status, employment status, Food Stamp receipt, Unemployment 
                                                 
6 Recipients were limited to 36 months of welfare in any 72-month period if they (1) had received 
AFDC for at least 36 of the 60 months prior to enrollment or (2) were under 24 years old and 
had no high school diploma and no recent work experience. 
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Insurance receipt up to 10 quarters prior to the random assignment and up to 20 
quarters since the random assignment. The survey was administrated to welfare 
applicants and those who are re-certified at the time when they applied for welfare 
receipt or were re-certified. It contains basic demographic characteristics, such as 
education, marital status, age group, ages of all kids in the family, working 
experience, etc.  Due to the confidentiality issue, the relevant calendar information 
is dropped out of the public use file.  
 
B. Descriptive statistics 
Our sample includes the 2810 single-parent families assigned to the 
random experiment from May 1994 to October1996. Since I focused on single 
mothers, I dropped male observations. After deleting the observations with 
missing values, I have 2657 observations left in the dataset, 1336 of those were 
assigned to the FTP group and 1321 to the AFDC group. To check the 
randomization is properly executed, I test the equality of means of different 
variables between these two groups.  
Table 1.1 summarizes the basic demographic characteristics for both FTP 
and AFDC groups. Overall, these demographic characteristics are quite similar 
between these two groups, with the p-values for testing equality of means are all 
above the level of 5 percent. Therefore the initial randomization was properly 
executed. Like welfare recipients elsewhere, the sample members are 
disproportionately black (around 52 percent) and low educated with 11 years of 
schooling on average7. Their low education status likely presented them a great 
barrier in job market. In addition, they had weak labour market attachments and 
high levels of welfare usage. At the time of random assignment, the ongoing 
recipients and new entrants were assigned to the two groups randomly so that 
there was no systematic behavioural difference. Moreover, around 45 percent 
members of both groups were falling into the age category of between 25 and 34, 
which means nearly half of the observations were at the prime working age. 
                                                 
7 For the highest degree obtained, around 44 percent of the sample members have a high school 
diploma, and around 40 percent have no degree at all.  
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Implementing a program that offered proper work incentives thus had important 
implications in terms of self-efficiency and anti-poverty. 
 
Table 1.1 --Summary Characteristics of The FTP and AFDC Groups 
at The Time of Random Assignment 
 
Characteristics 
FTP 
Group 
(μ1) 
AFDC 
Group
(μ0) 
Mean 
Difference 
(μ1-μ0) 
P-Value 
(Ho:μ1-μ0=0)
Mother black 52.4 52.0 0.4 0.84 
Years of schooling 11.0 11.1 -0.1 0.06 
Number of kids 2.0 2.0 0.0 0.59 
Age of youngest kids 5.0 5.2 -0.2 0.40 
Month of welfare utilization in 24 
months prior to random assignment 12.4 12.6 -0.26 0.49 
Quarters of employment in 2 years 
prior to random  
assignment 8 
2.1 2.1 0.0 0.64 
New entrants  51.9 49.8 2.1 0.28 
Mother age less than 20 8.2 6.4 1.8 
Mother age between 20 and 24 25.2 26.0 -0.7 
Mother age between 25 and 34 44.6 44.7 -0.1 
Mother age between 35 and 44 18.7 19.8 -1.0 
Mother age greater than 45 3.1 3.1 0.0 
0.49 
Number of observations 1336 1321 -- -- 
 
Note: Tables entries are sample means; for the age categories of single mothers, Pearson Chi2 
test is applied. 
 
In Table 1.2, I summarize the working experience in further detail for the 
FTP and AFDC group. Because of the randomization there is no significant 
difference between these two groups in term of past working history or job 
searching behaviour. In the Private Opinion Survey, single mothers have reported 
several reasons, such as arranging child care, family problems, health or 
emotional problems, etc., for not being able to work. Overall, the single mothers 
                                                 
8 For simplicity reason, here the dummy of employment status takes the value of 1 as long as the 
corresponding quarterly earning is greater than 0. 
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in the sample lacked recent labour market experience, which also explains to some 
extent the low job take-up rates in my hazard model. However, the original 
dataset didn’t provide important information about the past job such as economic 
sector, profession, distance to work, etc. Without this information, it is difficult to 
estimate the individual’s decision to take a specific job offer after the random 
assignment.  
 
Table 1.2 -- Comparison of Working Experience Features 
              of The FTP and AFDC Groups  
                  at The Time of Random Assignment 
 
Variables 
FTP 
Group 
(μ1) 
AFDC 
Group 
(μ0) 
Mean 
Difference 
(μ1-μ0) 
P-Value 
(Ho:μ1-μ0=0)
Never worked before random 
assignment 9.3 9.7 -0.4 0.72 
Ever worked full-time 6 
months or more 58.9 59.3 -0.4 0.82 
Looked for work in the past 
12 months 35.2 33.4 1.8 0.33 
Employed in the past 12 
months 46.1 44.7 1.4 0.45 
Currently employed 16.1 17.0 -0.8 0.59 
 
Note: Tables entries are sample means. 
 
Table 1.3 summarizes the welfare dependency for both groups. I define the 
short-term recipient as staying on welfare less than 2 years and long-term 
recipient longer than 2 years.  It is worth noting that on average the sample 
members are quite dependent on welfare, with 52 percent of the FTP and 56 
percent of the AFDC being long-term recipients. For them, cash assistance from 
the welfare program was one of the most important resources for their families. 
The FTP program, which promoted self-sufficiency through work, limited benefit 
receipts to a much shorter period. Considering their job barriers, one result of the 
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FTP program might be that it would put these families that relied on welfare to a 
large extent into an economically worse situation9. 
Table 1.3 -- Comparison of Welfare Dependency  
of The FTP and AFDC Groups 
at The Time of Random Assignment 
 
 
Variables 
FTP 
Group 
(μ1) 
AFDC 
Group 
(μ0) 
Mean 
Difference 
(μ1-μ0) 
P-Value 
(Ho:μ1-μ0=0)
Short term recipient (less than 2 
years) 36.0 33.1 2.9 0.11 
Long term recipient (greater than 2 
years) 52.2 55.9 -3.7 0.06 
Never receiving AFDC 11.8 11.0 0.7 0.53 
1 16.6 16.1 0.5 
2 64.8 66.0 -1.3 Level of economically disadvantaged10 
3 18.7 17.9 0.8 
0.79 
 
Note: Tables entries are sample means; for the 3 levels of economically disadvantages, Pearson 
Chi2 test is applied. 
 
Comparing the mean statistics of the FTP and AFDC groups, the pre-
treatment characteristics are not systematically different. Since the randomization 
is well conducted, it provides a rather convenient approach for the analysis of the 
program impact on the employment probability in next sections. I can therefore 
assess the effectiveness of the program without further identification issues since 
the effects of the external economical condition and other programs such as food 
stamp, social security support on both groups are similar.  
 
III: Employment Probabilities 
A. Redefining the Employment Status 
                                                 
9 The MDRC evaluation report indicates that ‘FTP did not affect hardships associated with 
material well-being, food security and the need to rely on social services’.  
10 Level 1 is defined as on welfare greater than 2 years, no high school diploma, no work in past 
year; level 3 is defined as not on welfare 2 or more years, has worked in past year, has high 
school diploma; level 2 is everybody else. 
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I set the analysis period to 8 quarters prior to and 16 quarters after the 
random assignment11. The quarterly employment dummy in the original data is 
defined as long as earnings are greater than zero, which is too general to reveal 
more detailed information about part-time or full-time employment12. I therefore 
create the new employment status according to earnings statistics and define it as 
follows: irregularly part-time employed; part-time or irregularly full-time 
employed; regularly full-time employed. 
  
Figure 1.1: Mean Earnings for FTP and AFDC Groups 
(Prior to Random Assignment) 
 
 
 
Figure 1.1 plots the mean earnings of the FTP and AFDC groups 8 
quarters prior to the random assignment. As it shows, the average earnings for 
both groups were quite low. The AFDC group had relatively higher average 
quarterly earning than the FTP group, though the difference is not so high (with 
                                                 
11 In the original dataset, the employment status was recorded up to 10 quarters prior to and 20 
quarters after the random assignment. Since not all the members were well followed, there are a 
lot of missing values from 9th quarter prior to and 17th quarter after. 
12 This employment definition is also adopted by Bloom at et all (2000). 
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the largest one amount to $50). From the second quarter prior to the random 
assignment on, these two groups had quite similar average quarterly earnings, 
which also reinforced the randomization of eligibility when the experiment 
happened. The median of the quarterly average earnings are all zero, which 
implies that at least 50 percent of both groups had no earnings from work at all. 
This is no doubt related to the low employment rate for these single mothers.  
 
Figure 1.2: Mean Earnings for FTP and AFDC Groups 
(After Random Assignment) 
 
 
Figure 1.2 plots the means of quarterly earnings after the random 
assignment. Quarter 0 is when the random assignment happened. As it shows, the 
average earnings between these two groups at the first quarter after random 
assignment were not very different from each other. However, starting from 
quarter 2 after the random assignment, the gap between these two groups started 
becoming positive and increased rapidly in year 2 and 3. In quarter 4, the average 
earning of the FTP members already exceeded that of AFDC members by around 
12%, in quarter 8 by 21%. The incentive to work and earn money appeared 
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stronger in the FTP group. Starting from quarter 14, the gap reduced and on 
average, the FTP members earned only 7% more than their counterparts and 10% 
more at the end of the follow-up period. One explanation would lie in the state 
wide implementation of WAGES (Work and Gain Economic Self-Sufficiency) 
after year 1996. Even though those who remained in Escambia County were not 
actually subject to WAGES until after the study ended, the behaviour of some 
AFDC group members, exposed to the heavy publicity, was affected to some 
extent. In addition to the favourable macroeconomic environment where there was 
steady and stable economic growth during mid 1990’s, this can somehow explain 
the upward trend in average earnings across time. Unfortunately, I do not have a 
longer follow-up period. The trend of the earnings pattern is thus unknown. The 
FTP group might have only a shorter period gain over the AFDC group. Over a 
longer horizon, the gain might disappear and these two groups might finally have 
the same average earnings. 
As the sample members I study here faced more serious work barriers than 
other groups in the society, I define the part-time and full-time employment in a 
relative loose way. First I define the potential quarterly earnings for part-time and 
full-time employment. I take the minimum wage of $4.25 per hour in year 1994 in 
Florida as the potential wage the single mother would earn if she took a job that is 
mainly low paid due to her limited working experience and education. Part-time 
working hours per week are defined as a minimum of 10 hours. Full-time working  
hours per week are defined as 35 hours. Therefore, I could calculate the potential 
quarterly earning as $510 for the part-time employment and $1785 for the full-
time employment. Therefore, if a sample member has zero earnings for a specific 
quarter, then her status is unemployed. If her earnings are greater than zero but 
less than $510, then she is classified as irregularly part-time employed for that 
quarter. If her earnings are greater than $510 but less than $1785, then she is 
classified as part-time employed or irregularly full-time employed and as full-time 
employed if earnings are more than $1785. 
 
B. Probabilities of Employment of Three Different Forms 
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Figure 1.3 plots the probabilities of irregularly part-time employment for 
the FTP and AFDC group. Overall, both groups have shown downward trends 
across time since the random assignment. However, there was no significant 
difference between these two groups. The test of equality of means yields a high 
p-value of 41 percent; therefore I can not reject the hypothesis that both groups 
had similar means.  
 
Figure 1.3: Probability of Irregularly Part Time Employed 
    (After Random Assignment) 
 
 
 Figure 1.4 plots the probabilities of part-time employment for the FTP and 
AFDC group. During the first 12 quarters after random assignment, the 
probability for the FTP group was consistently higher than for the AFDC group 
and it peaked in the 8th quarter with 17 percent, with 4 percent more than the 
AFDC group. However, the last 4 quarters showed a reverse situation, with a 
lower probability of being part-time employed for the FTP group than for the 
AFDC group. Over the four years follow-up period, the impact of the FTP 
program on taking part-time job increased in the first two years and then 
decreased dramatically in the next 2 years. A test of equality of means yields a p-
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value of 0.1 percent, which is highly significant and strongly rejects the 
hypothesis that both groups had the same means.  
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Figure 1.4: Probability of Part Time Employed 
    (After Random Assignment) 
 
 
Figure 1.5: Probability of Full Time Employed 
                 (After Random Assignment) 
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Figure 1.5 plots the probability of full-time employment for the FTP and 
AFDC group. Except in the first quarter after random assignment when the 
probability was slightly lower for the FTP group than for the AFDC group, it was 
consistently higher through the follow-up period. Starting from around 8 percent 
at the time of the random assignment for both groups, both trends were upward 
increasing, with 33 percent for the FTP group and 30 percent for the AFDC group 
in the last quarter. Apparently, there was an upward time trend that showed that 
the FTP program was operated under a favourable economic environment where 
the overall employment was steadily increasing. The gap between the FTP and 
AFDC group was increasing gradually across the time and peaked at the third year 
but then decreased in the fourth year. The test of equality of means yields a high 
p-value less than 0.1 percent. Therefore the difference in probabilities of full-time 
employed was statistically higher for the FTP group than for the AFDC group. 
Moreover, Figure 1.5 tracks quite closely the earnings pattern compared to Figure 
1.2. Gains in earnings were mostly contributed by the full-time employment.  
 Figure 1.6 shows the probabilities of unemployment. It is obvious that the 
FTP group had lower probabilities across all the quarters after the random 
assignment. Especially in year 2 and 3, the difference in probability was larger 
than in year 1 and year 4. The FTP program had significant impact on reducing 
unemployment. Actually in the later period, the probability of being unemployed 
was increasing for the FTP group and the difference between these two groups 
were diminishing. Even though the unemployment probability was decreasing 
with the time for both groups, it is still noticeable that the probabilities were quite 
high. At the time of random assignment, they were around 65 percent. Then they 
were reduced to around 50 percent in the last quarter. The overall downward trend 
can be attributed the reasons like the favorable economic condition in mid 1990s 
and the anticipation effect of participating in WAGES after 1996. 
Overall, FTP had a positive effect on being part-time and full-time 
employed. In this sense, FTP has fulfilled its target of encouraging the single 
mothers to seek means for self-sufficiency. However, the program had effects 
only in the very short term, about 2 or 3 years after the implementation. At the end 
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of the follow-up period, the difference diminished and the AFDC group caught up. 
The unusual environment under which the FTP program was operated — a period 
of low unemployment and stable economic growth, highly publicized changes in 
state and national welfare policies shaped the outcomes of the AFDC group, and 
therefore left little room for FTP to generate significant impacts. 
 
Figure 1.6: Probability of Unemployed 
         (After Random Assignment) 
 
 
 
C. Employment Probability Based on Different Characteristics 
 To examine further how the probabilities of employment differ amongst 
the different characteristics of the FTP and AFDC groups, I group the 
observations at the time of the random assignment into short term and long term 
recipients, new entrants and ongoing recipients, first time and non-first time 
applicants, families with and without preschool-age children, and the high and 
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low level of economically disadvantaged. Within each group, I examine two types 
of employment possibilities: part-time employment, and full-time employment13. 
 
Figure 1.7: Employment Probability for Short-Term Recipients 
(After Random Assignment) 
 
 
Figure 1.7 first plots the employment probabilities for the short-term 
recipients staying on welfare for less than 2 years at the time of the random 
assignment, while Figure 1.8 plots the employment probabilities for the long-term 
recipients staying on welfare for longer than 2 years. Comparing these two graphs 
provides some interesting interpretations. First of all, at the time of random 
assignment, the probabilities of being part-time or full-time employed were 
obviously higher for the short-term recipients than for the long-term recipients. 
This is related to the degree of welfare dependency of short-term and long-term 
recipients. Long-term recipients are more reliant on welfare assistance. Compared 
with the AFDC group, the FTP program also had a larger impact on the 
                                                 
13 I omit the irregularly part-time employment type since for both FTP and AFDC groups the 
probabilities can be hardly distinguished from each other based on different characteristics. The 
relevant statistics are available upon request. 
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probability of part-time employment for the long-term recipients up to quarter 11, 
while for the short-term recipients the FTP program had a larger impact on full-
time working rather than part-time employment. At the end of the follow-up 
period, the probabilities of being full-time or part-time employed were quite close 
for short-term and long-term recipients. It corresponds to the previous conclusion 
that at the end of the follow-up period the program gains became less clear as the 
AFDC group caught up due to higher exposure by widely publicized information 
of changes in state and national welfare policies and the overall healthy economic 
conditions. 
  
Figure 1.8: Employment Probability for Long-Term Recipients 
(After Random Assignment) 
 
 
Figure 1.9 and Figure 1.10 plot the probabilities of employment for the first time 
recipients and non-first time recipients. At the time of the random assignment, the 
first time recipients were more likely to work part-time and full-time. One 
puzzling result from Figure 1.9 is that the probability of full-time employment for 
the first time recipients in the FTP group was clearly much lower than those for 
their counterparts in the AFDC group. One reasonable explanation might be 
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attributed to the different social enhanced services provided by FTP and AFDC 
program. For first-time recipients, enhanced traditional social services provided 
by the AFDC program and the low-income eligibility threshold were not as 
attractive as finding a full-time job. For those in the FTP program, the enhanced 
social services program including pre-job training, employment related services, 
intensive case management, etc., encouraged them to take advantage of the FTP 
program in order to accumulate more human capital for future labour market 
participation. Compared with the non-first time recipients, the first time recipients 
were apparently more likely to be full-time employed and less likely to take the 
part-time job, no matter which group they were in.  
 
Figure 1.9: Employment Probability for First-Time Recipients 
(After Random Assignment) 
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Figure 1.10: Employment Probability for Non First-Time Recipients 
(After Random Assignment) 
 
Figure 1.11 and Figure 1.12 plot the probabilities of employment for the 
families with and without pre-school age children14. There are 1807 families with 
preschool children, more than half of the total observations in the data. For the 
families without pre-school age children in either FTP or AFDC groups, the 
probabilities of full-time employment were higher than those with pre-school age 
children. Both graphs show that the FTP program had some impact on the 
probabilities full-time employment, especially from around year 2 up to the end of 
the study period. For example, the program can account for about 5% of the 
increase in the full-time employment probability for those with pre-school age 
children in quarter 9 and 13, and about 9% of the increase for those without pre-
school age children. The impact was slightly larger for those without pre-school 
age children during the next half of the study period. Considering the more 
generous transitional child-care assistance provided by the FTP program- the 
families leaving  
                                                 
14 Pre-school age is defined as age 6. 
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Figure 1.11: Employment Probability for Families with Pre-School Age  
Children (After Random Assignment) 
 
Figure 1.12: Employment Probability for Families with no Pre-School Age 
Children (After Random Assignment) 
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welfare for work in the FTP group would have 2 years of transitional child-care 
assistance while for those in AFDC group only one year of assistance available- it 
is surprising to see that the program was less effective among families with pre-
school age children than among families without pre-school age children, 
provided that the effects of time limits, financial incentives and other work-
requirements were the same for these two subgroups. 
The last characteristics I examine are subgroups of high and low levels of 
economically disadvantaged families15. By definition, the high level group had 
higher degrees of welfare dependency, faced more serious job barrier, and would 
have lower earning potential than the low level group. Figure 1.13 and Figure 1.14 
plot the probability of employment for high-level and low-level of economically 
disadvantaged families respectively. It is not surprising to see that at quarter 0, or 
the time of random assignment, the probabilities of employment were quite low 
and nearly none of the high level of economically disadvantaged individuals was 
employed full-time. While the program impact became apparent for the low level 
group in terms of full-time employment, it is difficult to be distinguished among 
the high level group. Thus the employment gain was more concentrated among 
the low level of economically disadvantaged families. The probabilities of full-
time employed were increasing from 25 percent for both FTP and AFDC groups 
to 48 percent for the FTP group and to 45 percent for the AFDC group. The 
program failed to improve the welfare of the high level group and this subgroup 
should deserve more attention due to their relatively bigger disadvantages in the 
labour market.  
 
                                                 
15 High-level is defined as level 1 and Low-level as level 3 in Table 3. 
 
 25
Figure 1.13: Employment Probability for H-Level Economically  
                 Disadvantaged (After Random Assignment) 
 
 
Figure 1.14: Employment Probability for L-Level Economically  
                   Disadvantaged (After Random Assignment) 
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From the previous analysis that was based either on the whole FTP and 
AFDC group or the subgroups of different characteristics, one common 
characteristic is that the FTP program had impact mostly in year 2 and 3, but the 
program gain in terms of employment became quite small and even indiscernible 
at the end of the study period. Over the 16 quarters, the single mothers were more 
likely to switch from part-time jobs to full-time jobs. The employment gain from 
the implementation of the FTP program was mainly in full-time employment. 
However, for some subgroups, I have found that the transitional child care 
assistance provided by the FTP program didn’t help single mothers with pre-
school age children to be better off in the job market, and the program showed 
poor outcomes on improving the subgroup of highly economically disadvantaged 
members. Since 4-year followed up period is too short to make credible 
conclusions about the long-term employment dynamics, I am only able to infer 
that at least in the short term, the FTP program as a whole had some positive 
effect on increasing full-time employment probabilities, but this effect diminished 
at the end of the study period.  
 
IV. Unemployment Spells and Econometric Estimation 
A. Econometric Model 
The previous section is mainly devoted to analyzing the probability of 
three different types of employment within 16 quarters after the random 
assignment. A further step is to look at how the FTP program has changed the 
speed of leaving unemployment or consequently picking up a new job that is 
irregularly part-time, part-time, or full-time one. Here I refer to the hazard rate (or 
transition rate) of exit from unemployment, which is a conditional probability that 
describes the incidence of an event over time. It differs naturally from the 
previous probability analysis that simply takes means of incidence rates for each 
time interval without considering the prior conditions.  
I estimate a discrete-time proportional hazard model with competing risks. 
As the sample members were mostly characterized by low education and weak 
labour force attachment, their job stability was relatively low. Therefore they 
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frequently switched between working and not working. I could obtain at least one 
spell for each individual during the study period. Nevertheless, since the treatment 
dummy, or the FTP program, is of our interest for the moment, I only take the 
single unemployment spell that ends at or after the random assignment. Due to 
this nature, the model actually estimates the program impact on the probability of 
taking up the first available job after the random assignment. 
Let T denote the nonnegative length of the unemployment spell as I 
construct in the data. x(t) is a vector of covariates summarizing observed 
differences between individuals at time t. x(t) may be time varying. Let J denote 
the competing risks or destination states which in the data is irregularly part-time 
employment / part-time employment / full-time employment. The discrete time 
hazard (or transition) rate at tth quarter from unemployment to another destination 
is the conditional probability of the exit from unemployment at t, given that she 
has been unemployed until (t-1)th quarter and is defined as: 
3,2,1)),(,,11Pr())(( ==−>≤<−= jtxjJtTtTttxth j  
and 1))((0 ≤≤ txth j . 
A discrete time representation of a continuous time proportional hazards 
model leads to the so-called complementary log-log specification16. The resulting 
discrete time hazard rate is specified as 
[ ]))'(exp(exp1))(( jjtj txtxth βγ +−−=  
or 
[ ] jtjj txtxth γβ +=−− )'()))((1loglog(  
where [ ]∫ −= tt jjt duuh1 0 )(logγ  is the log difference between the integrated 
baseline hazard hj0 (t) evaluated at quarterly interval (t-1, t]. To put things another 
way, the γjt summarizes the pattern of duration dependence in the interval, here 
quarterly, hazard rates. It can be estimated by a parametric function of duration or 
                                                 
16 see Prentice and Gloeckler(1978) 
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non-parametric specification17. jβ represents a vector of the destination specific 
parameters of the covariates. 
 Up to now, the econometric model discussed assumes no unobserved 
individual effects. Let v denote the unobserved differences between observations. 
The random variable v takes a probability distribution with mean 1 and finite 
variance σ2. The crucial assumption about v is that it is distributed independently 
of X, the covariates vector.  
For the discrete time proportional hazard model, the Gamma distribution 
has been the most popular distribution used in the literature. The hazard function 
incorporating unobserved heterogeneity, v, is written as: 
[ ])ln())'(exp(exp1)),(( vtxvtxth jjtj ++−−= βγ  
or 
[ ] utxtxth jtjj ++=−− γβ)'()))((1loglog(  
with u ≡ ln(v), which is random variable with a mean of zero. The random 
variable v, or equivalently u, may be interpreted in several ways. The most 
common one is that it summarizes the impact of omitted variables on the hazard 
rate. This problem arises either because the missing variables are intrinsically 
unobservable or simply unobserved in the data set to hand. An alternative 
interpretation can be offered in terms of error of measurement in recorded 
variables or recorded survival times18. The literature suggests several findings if 
the unobserved heterogeneity is ignored in modelling. First of all, the ‘no-frailty’ 
model will over-estimate the degree of negative duration dependence in the hazard 
and under-estimate the degree of positive duration dependence. Second, the 
proportionate response of the hazard rate to a change in a covariate is under-
estimated19.  
                                                 
17  A non-parametric approach to characterize the frailty distribution was pioneered in the 
econometric literature by Heckman and Singer (1984). The idea is essentially that one fits an 
arbitrary distribution using a set of parameters. These parameters comprise a set of ‘mass points’ 
and the probabilities of a person being located at each mass point.  
18 See Lancaster 1990, Chapter 4. 
19 In the statistics software STATA, pgmhaz8 provides a likelihood ratio test for 
checking whether the unobserved heterogeneity is statistically significant. 
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 In the hazard model with competing risks, provided that the risks are 
independent, the estimation of can be simply done by estimating a single risk 
model. The discrete hazard rate for exit at time t to any destination is the sum of 
the destination-specific discrete hazard rates. That is: 
h(t) = h1(t)+ h2(t)+ h3(t), 
The likelihood function is the product of the likelihood to each of the three 
destinations and the likelihood of right censored, that is, still remained 
unemployed at time t.  
 
B. Descriptive statistics of the unemployment spells. 
 This subsection describes some characteristics of the unemployment spells. 
Table 1.4 provides a comparison of the basic features of the unemployment spells 
and the exit destinations between the FTP and AFDC groups. There are total 2657 
spells in the dataset, 1336 or FTP group and 1321 for the AFDC group. The mean 
spell length is 8.9 and 9.4 quarters for the FTP and AFDC group, respectively. 
The longest spell length is 25 quarters, which is the whole study period. These are 
so called right-censored spells as individuals still remained unemployed at the end 
of the study period. There are 313 right-censored spells out of a total of 2657. A 
first glance at Table 1.4 does not show obvious differences for the frequencies of 
exit into irregularly PT job, PT job, and FT job between the FTP and AFDC group. 
For exit into irregularly PT jobs, both groups were very close, with 58.9 percent 
for the FTP and 58.2 percent for the AFDC group, which means quite a large 
proportion of the members worked irregularly once unemployed and earned a 
very small amount. For exit into a PT job, the gap was somehow bigger, with 20.4 
percent for the FTP and 18.7 percent for the AFC group. For the exit into a full-
time job, the FTP group had even lower frequency than the AFDC group. 
However, the above information is not quite contrary to Figure 1.3 through Figure 
1.5 in the previous sections. Since the spells I analyse here are the length of 
unemployment up to the first job after the random  
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assignment, they do not reflect the dynamics of switching between unemployment 
and employment over the whole study period.  
 
Table 1.4 -- Comparison of Spell Features of The FTP and AFDC Groups 
 
Features 
 
FTP Group 
 
 
AFDC Group 
 
Total 
Number of spells 1336 1321 2657 
Mean spell length (in quarters) 8.9 9.4 9.2 
Right-censored spells 14.2 15.5 14.9 
Unemployed throughout the 
whole study period 11.5 12.1 11.8 
Exit into irregularly PT job 58.9 58.2 58.6 
Exit into PT job 20.4 18.7 19.6 
Exit into FT job 6.4 7.5 7.0 
 
Note: entries are frequencies except for number of spells and mean spell length. 
 
C. Non-parametric Analysis 
 First I examine the speed of leaving unemployment, regardless of which 
exit destination. Figure 1.15 presents life-table estimates of the survival 
probability of being unemployed for the FTP and AFDC group20. For both groups, 
it shows that the probabilities declined more rapidly in the first 20 quarters. 
Around 75 percent members in both groups remained unemployed at the very 
beginning of the unemployment phase. After 20 quarters unemployed, around 18 
percent of the AFDC members survived, i.e., were still unemployed and around 
15 percent of the FTP members were unemployed. Though the survival 
probabilities for the FTP group were consistently lower than those for the AFDC 
group, the difference between them was not very distinct. Up to the 8th quarter, the 
survival probabilities for two groups traced each other quite closely. It means that 
for single mothers who have been unemployed less than 2 years, the rates of exit 
from unemployment were quite close, regardless of which group they were 
                                                 
20 J. Wolff (2002): "ltable1: STATA module to overlay Survival/Hazard-curves of distinct sub-
samples". 
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assigned. There is a kink at the 8th quarter of unemployment, with the probabilities 
of remaining unemployed decreasing at a faster speed and the speed of exit from 
unemployment starting lightly accelerated with the introduction of the FTP 
program. This same kinked pattern also shows up in the hazard rate plots. For 
those who have been unemployed recently for more than 20 quarters, the speed of 
exit from unemployment slowed down. The probabilities of remaining 
unemployed were 14 percent for the FTP group and 15 percent for the AFDC 
group. Overall, comparing the survival probabilities of unemployment between 
the FTP and AFDC group shows that the FTP program didn’t significantly speed 
up the single mothers to take the first available job after the random assignment. 
The likelihood ratio test statistics of homogeneity between these two groups 
yields a p-value of 9 percent.  
 
Figure 1.15: Survival Probabilities of Unemployment 
 
 
Figure 1.16 to Figure 1.18 plot the life-table estimates of hazard rates into 
three destinations together with 95 percent confidence intervals. A first glance at 
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the confidence bands show that apparently there is no significant difference 
between the exit rates to all three destinations for the FTP and AFDC group.  
 In Figure 1.16, the hazard rate of transition into irregularly part-time jobs 
was relative high at the first quarter of unemployment- around 28 percent for both 
groups. Then there is a sharp drop in the second quarter to around 4 percent for 
the AFDC group and 3 percent for the FTP group. As I defined irregularly part-
time employment as having quarterly earning less than $510, a rather low amount, 
being irregularly employed in this case might mean only getting some hourly job 
from time to time and there might be some time spent on job search as well. 
Therefore, the first quarter of unemployment serves as a transition period to 
getting a part-time job or full-time job. Another jump of the hazard rate of exit 
into irregularly part-time job happened after an unemployment duration of 8 
quarters, from 1 percent to 11 percent for the FTP group and from 1 percent to 14 
percent for the AFDC group. It means that after two years of unemployment the 
probability of picking up some irregularly part-time job became higher. Since the 
10th quarter of unemployment, the probabilities of exit into an irregularly part-
time job became less than 6 percent and remain quite constant over the rest of the 
unemployment horizon.  
 
Figure 1.16: Hazard Rate of Exit into Irregularly PT Job 
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Figure 1.17 plots the hazard rates of exit into a part-time job for the FTP 
and AFDC group. Over the whole unemployment duration, the hazard rates, or 
conditional probabilities were quite low and the difference between these two 
groups is hardly seen. Up to the 9th quarter of being unemployed, the hazard rates 
varied between 1 to 3 percent. In quarter 10, the hazard rates of exit into part-time 
jobs increased for both groups to above 5 percent. After that the gaps between 
these two groups became larger. However the overlapping confidence bands show 
that the difference is insignificant. At the few quarters close to the end of the 
duration I studied, the hazard rates were a little bit higher for the AFDC group.  
 
Figure 1.17: Hazard Rate of Exit into PT Job 
 
 
For the hazard rates of exit into a full-time job, the pattern exhibited in 
Figure 1.18 is quite similar to the one in Figure 1.17. Up to the 10th quarter, the 
hazard rates stayed under 1 percent. In quarter 10, the hazard rates increased to 2.2 
percent for the AFDC group and 1.7 percent for the FTP group. Similar to the 
figure for exit into a part-time job, since the 19th quarter the hazard rates for the 
AFDC group were higher than the FTP group except in quarter 25.  
 
 34
In general, the FTP didn’t seem to speed up the take-up rates of the first 
available job compared with the AFDC group as shown in these graphs from life-
table estimates.  
 
Figure 1.18: Hazard Rate of Exit into FT Job 
 
 
D. Parametric analysis of unemployment duration with covariates 
In this section I discuss the effect of covariates on the hazard rates in a 
discrete time proportional hazard model incorporating unobserved heterogeneity 
that has a gamma distribution. The previous non-parametric analysis shows that 
there is no obvious gain from the FTP program. The estimation of the econometric 
model presented in subsection A controls some observed differences such as race, 
education, mother’s age, number of children at home, whether there are pre-
school age children present, welfare dependency, length of employment in the 
previous two years, level of economically disadvantaged, etc. The baseline hazard 
is parameterized by taking the logarithm of the unemployment duration and it 
summarizes the duration dependence. 
In the study of unemployment duration, the receipt of unemployment 
insurance is usually an important explanatory variable. In our dataset, as the 
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subjects are low educated single mothers with weak labor force attachment, the 
unemployment insurance receipt is not a common practice. During the whole 
study period, 2 years prior to and 4 years after the random assignment, there are 
only around 1 percent of the sample members receiving unemployment insurance. 
Moreover, there is no information for calculating the remaining time eligible for 
unemployment insurance receipt. I leave this variable out of the estimation. 
One shortcoming of our data is that the characteristics of the exit states are 
missing. Therefore I have no detailed information such as the industry, actual 
hourly pay, whether health insurance is provided, distance from home, etc, about 
the job they took. From the previous analysis, I would predict that the jobs they 
took are mostly low paying and less stable ones in line with their background.  
Table 1.5 displays the coefficient estimates from the model with 
unobserved heterogeneity together with the log likelihood and the likelihood ratio 
test of heterogeneity. The coefficient of log(t) is 1.96 for exit into irregularly part-
time jobs, which can be interpreted as the elasticity of the hazard with respect to 
time. A similar interpretation applies to baseline hazards of the exit into part-time 
(2.15) and full-time jobs (2.41), respectively. As this negative duration 
dependence pattern shows, the hazard rates are getting higher with time. After 
controlling for the observed characteristics and unobserved heterogeneity, the 
coefficient on the FTP dummy is insignificant for exit into all three destinations, 
which is in line with the analysis from previous graphs. The FTP program in 
general didn’t speed up the exit from unemployment to irregularly part-time jobs, 
or part-time jobs or full-time jobs. The same true for the insignificant impact of 
36-month time clock21. The race dummy of black appears only significant in the 
exit into irregularly part-time jobs. The coefficient, 0.69, means that the hazard for 
black single mothers is on average 31 percent lower than their white counterparts. 
For exit into part-time or full-time jobs, there is no significant difference between 
being black or white. Number of children and whether having pre-school age 
children at home are only significant in exit into part-time jobs. The single 
                                                 
21 This is actually an imputed variable as the AFDC members faced no time limit at all. 
Michalopoulos from MDRC provided detailed explanation about imputation. 
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mothers preferred part-time jobs when there were more kids at home. For mothers 
who were under 35 years old at the time of random assignment, the hazard rates 
are significantly higher for exit into a non full-time job than those who were older 
than 35 years old. Previous employment in the 2 years preceding the random 
assignment is important for increasing the hazard to exit from unemployment into 
three different jobs. The indicator of less economically disadvantaged is 
significant in explaining the hazard of exit as well. The likelihood ratio tests yield 
chi-squares that are significant at 1 percent level, which indicate the unobserved 
heterogeneity can’t be ignored in my model.  
Overall, the estimation from the frailty model indicates that the FTP 
program had no significant impact on exit from unemployment to employment in 
the first available job after the random assignment. As I study only the single 
unemployment spells during which the random experiment took place, this 
insignificant result is not completely surprising. For the single mothers assigned to 
the FTP program, the incentive to take up a job immediately after the random 
assignment may not be strong since they might prefer to stay unemployed on 
welfare and take advantage of the job-related services furnished by the FTP 
program to accumulate the human capital for future use. Therefore, I could not 
capture the potential impact of the program in the long run due to the data 
limitations. 
 
V. Conclusion 
 
 In this chapter, I mainly focus on how the FTP program influences the 
probabilities of employment for single mothers, who are the major welfare 
recipients, and the speed of leaving unemployment to start the first available job. 
The three main components of the FTP program include time limits, financial 
incentives and work-related mandatory requirements. I study the effect of the 
program as a whole instead of a specific policy component in this chapter. 
I found that over the 4-year follow-up period, the FTP members were 
more likely to be full-time employed and less likely to be part-time employed. 
There is no significant difference in terms of irregularly part-time employment, 
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which is possibly due to the nature of low quarterly earning of this kind of 
employment. At the end of the follow-up period, the employment gain started 
diminishing and these two groups became closer in employment probabilities. 
Other interesting results I find include that the more generous transitional child 
care assistance provided by the FTP program did not increase the employment 
probabilities of the single mothers with pre-school age children relative to those 
without, and that the FTP program was not effective in improving the economic 
situation of those highly economically disadvantaged members. Though the short 
study period does not allow me to make long term conclusions such as the impact 
on the employment in 10 years, it is no doubt quite helpful in understanding the 
impact of the FTP program in its implementation period from 1994 to 1999.  
The discrete time proportional hazard model with unobserved 
heterogeneity yields insignificant estimates of the effect of the FTP program on 
the hazard rates of exit from unemployment into irregularly part-time jobs, part-
time jobs or full-time jobs. The probability difference of remaining unemployed 
after certain time elapses between the FTP and AFDC groups are statistically 
insignificant. Once assigned to the FTP group, the single mothers tended to stay 
on welfare at the onset and took advantage of the enhanced services since their 
low education, weak labor market attachment and child care problems presented a 
serious job finding barrier.  This partly helps explain the insignificant impact of 
the FTP program on the exit from unemployment to the first available job. Even 
though the dynamics of switching between unemployment and employment is 
taken into account, the FTP program is expected to exert no important influence 
due to the limited potential job offers faced by the single mothers.  
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Table 1.5: Frailty Model Estimates of Program Effect on Hazard 
        Rates for Exit into Three Destinations 
Variable 
Exit into 
Irregularly PT 
Job 
(1) 
Exit into PT Job 
(2) 
Exit into FT Job
(3) 
Constant -7.877** (0. 924) 
-10.948***   
(0.918) 
-13.2705***   
(1.676) 
Baseline hazard (log(t)) 1.960*** (0.211) 
2.146*** 
(0.242) 
2.411***   
 (0.420) 
FTP dummy 0.184 (0.179) 
0.227 
(0.158) 
-0.218 
(0.281) 
36-month time limit 0.234 (0.222) 
-0.024 
(0.196) 
0.177 
(0.347) 
Mother black 0.692*** (0.200) 
-.020 
(0.172) 
-0.041   
 (0.299) 
Number of children -0.059 (0.089) 
0.195*** 
(0.073) 
0.158 
(0.138) 
Year of schooling -0.140** (0.070) 
0.077 
(0.057) 
0.144 
(0.100) 
Having pre-school age children 0.060 (0.232) 
-0.496**   
 (0.208) 
-0.355    
(0.372) 
Mother age less than 20 1.926*** (0.644) 
1.588 ***   
(0.567) 
1.123 
(1.028) 
Mother age between 20 and 24 1.845*** (0.559) 
1.258 ***  
 (0.480) 
0.695 
(0.864) 
Mother age between 25 and 34 1.219** (0.524) 
0.752* 
(0.444) 
1.060 
(0.796) 
Mother age between 35 and 44 0.391 (0.535) 
-0.222 
(0.460) 
0.844 
(0.805) 
Less economically disadvantaged 6.773*** (0.734) 
1.310*** 
(0.472) 
2.673***    
(0.938) 
Short-term recipient -0.966*** (0.251) 
-0.395 
(0.213) 
-0.028   
 (0.356) 
Month of welfare use in 24 months prior to 
random assignment 
0.007 
(0.011) 
.030*** 
(0.010) 
0.004 
(0.016) 
Quarters of employment in 2 years preceding 
random assignment 
2.246*** 
(0.232) 
0.738*** 
(0.074) 
0.745***    
(0.124) 
Log likelihood -4274.7838 -2322.7533 -1011.4948 
LR test of Gamma var. = 0, chibar2(01) 688.24 75.77 39.5479 
Note: *** 1 percent significance level, ** 5 percent significant level, * 10 percent significance level. 
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Appendix 1. Florida’s Family Transition Program: 
  Comparison of Policy Components Between FTP and AFDC 
 
Characteristics FTP Group AFDC Group 
Time limits on cash assistance 
receipt 
 
 
 
 
 
Financial work incentives 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Mandatory work-related activities 
(MWRAs) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Child care assistance for families 
leaving welfare for work 
 
 
 
 
Parental responsibilities mandates
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Asset limit for cash assistance 
eligibility  
24 months in any 60-month 
period for most recipients; 
36 months in any 72-month 
period for the least job-
ready. Exceptions under 
certain circumstances. 
 
The first $200 earnings are 
disregarded. The benefit 
reduction rate, or tax rate, for 
the remaining earnings is 50 
percent. 
 
 
 
30 hours per week of either 
work or word related 
activities. 
Mandate could be satisfied 
by participating in a welfare-
to-work program that 
provided enhanced 
employment and training 
services. 
Exemptions only for mothers 
with infants under 6 months 
of age. 
 
 
 
Two years of transitional 
child care assistance; 
eligibility beyond that point 
depended on eligibility for 
other programs. 
 
Parents had to ensure that 
children attended school 
regularly, and had to speak 
with teachers at least once 
each grading period. 
Applicants with preschool 
children had to prove that 
children had begun 
immunizations. 
 
 
$5,000 
None. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
First 4 months: $120 
disregard and 67 percent 
benefit reduction rate. 
Month 5-12: $120 disregard 
and 100 percent benefit 
reduction rate. After month 
12: $90 disregard. 
 
30 hours per week of either 
work or work-related 
activities. Mandate could be 
satisfied by participating in 
a welfare-to-work program 
that provided conventional 
AFDC services. 
Exemptions for mothers 
with children under 3 years 
old. 
 
 
 
 
One year of transitional 
child care assistance; 
eligibility beyond that point 
depended on eligibility for 
other programs. 
 
None. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
$1,000 
Source: The Family Transition Program: Final report on Florida’s Initial Time-Limited Welfare Program, 
summary report, sum-3 
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C h a p t e r  T w o  
 
 
 
 
Accounting for Life Insurance Holdings:  
Evidence from German Socio-Economic 
Panel Studies 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Life insurance is used to insure against the risk of premature death in 
order to smooth the consumption. This chapter studies the demand for 
life insurance holdings in Germany within an economic framework. I 
examine the driving forces behind the life insurance demand with the 
data from German Socio-Economic Panel Studies. After correcting for 
the autocorrelation of disturbances in the unbalanced panel data, I find 
that the bequest motives are quite strong among the households with 
children in holding life insurances; being unemployed has significant 
negative effect; higher marginal tax rates are related to higher demand 
for life insurances due to the tax incentive scheme in Germany. The 
self-reported risk attitude captures the individual heterogeneity in the 
panel dataset. I also evaluate the recent abolishment of tax advantages 
on life insurance contracts signed after Year 2004 and find positive 
anticipation effects in year 2003 and year 2004 after the beginning of 
the policy discussion. 
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I. Introduction 
Economists frequently refer to consumption smoothing, which means the 
household tries to maintain the same living standard level in the presence of 
lifetime uncertainties. To smooth consumption, the economic theory predicts that 
the household (with the key rationality assumption) will save and insure in order 
to reduce the risk of variability in their living styles. Life insurance, therefore, like 
other insurance, provides protection against the consumption risk in the event of a 
premature death of a household member. The first classical paper, written by 
Yaari (1965), describes the relationship between life insurance and uncertainties, 
where the bequest motive is modelled as one of the driving forces behind buying 
life insurance.  Furthermore, a set of conditions are derived under which the 
household will be fully insured against the lifetime uncertainties.  
Life insurance is an important means of saving in Germany. All life 
insurance policies provide term insurance, which refers simply to insurance 
provided by the policy in a given year, and pay death benefits to surviving family 
members or other beneficiaries.  Whole life insurance combines term insurance 
with a savings plan and can generate annuities or lump sum payments after a 
certain amount of time (usually 12 years). Paying premiums for a whole life 
policy is therefore equivalent to contributing to one’s saving account and also 
buying annual term insurance.  
The significance of life insurance as part of security for old age, disability 
and surviving dependents has been increasing for many years. According to GDV 
(Gesamtverband der Deutschen Versicherungswirschaft22), in Year 2003 there 
were around 8.0 million new contracts concluded. The premium income of life 
insurance increased from 13.2 billion Euro in Year 1980 to 67.3 billion Euro in 
Year 2003 and it amounts to more than 45% in private household savings. The 
share of life insurance in total volume of pension provision increases from 19.0% 
in Year 1993 to 33.3% in Year 2003. 
                                                 
22 German Insurance Association  
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Why do Germans spend so much on life insurance? What are the driving 
forces behind this demand? I consider the following scenarios: changes in family 
structure, changes in labour market participation and changes in the tax code.  
Changes in family structure, specifically changes in marital status and the 
presence of children at home can change bequest motives. A bequest motive is 
often viewed as a ‘joy of giving’. It was first seen in Yaari (1965). Bequest 
motives can be linked to the altruism of the insured towards their surviving spouse 
or their descendents. Several papers also depict how life insurance holdings vary 
across different household types. Auerbach and Kotlikoff (1991) find that middle-
aged married couples are more likely to have life insurance. Bernheim (1991) 
focuses on elderly married and single individuals. Chang (2004) presents a life 
cycle model of life insurance that takes into account the ages of young 
beneficiaries. They found that the size of contingent bequest shrinks as the child 
ages. 
In terms of change in labour market participation, I consider those who 
lose their job as well as women who exit from the labour market and become 
housewives. Being unemployed imposes a big shock to the household’s financial 
stability. When the head of the household or the spouse is unemployed, how can 
the household smooth its consumption and simultaneously insure life against 
future uncertainties? Will the household spend down its savings or cancel any 
insurances policies (not the obligatory ones) to secure the current financial 
situation? Another concern is the asymmetric gender bias within a household in 
terms of life insurance holdings. Are housewives less likely to be insured? If so, a 
husband faces a lower level of protection if his spouse passes away. Bernheim, 
Forni, Gokhale and Kotlikoff (2003) examine the life insurance adequacy for 
couples approaching retirement age with the Health and Retirement Study (HRS) 
data and they find that a sizable minority of couples in the HRS sample are less 
likely to be insured. Given the aging problem in Germany and the rest of Europe, 
it is important to examine the consequences of inadequate life insurance on the 
welfare of the elderly. 
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Change in tax code is positively related to life insurance holdings in 
Germany. As life insurance is equivalent to a tax-free saving in Germany,23 
theoretical models predict that tax incentives will increase the demand. Winter 
and Walliser (1998) find the demand for life insurance is positively related to the 
average tax rate. Richter and Ruß (2001) find that in the German insurance market, 
possible advantages from purchasing the contract combining whole life insurance 
and immediate annuity are clearly increasing in the tax rate and in age. I construct 
the marginal tax rate 24  out of GSOEP and use it to study the effect of tax 
incentives. However, tax benefits have been abolished on life-insurance policies 
signed after Dec. 31, 200425. As the discussion was first beginning in Year 2003, I 
use the data to study the program anticipation effect, i.e., how people respond to 
their expectation of policy change. 
In addition, I explore the self-reported risk preference in predicting the 
demand for life insurance. Dohmen et al. (2005) have proved the consistency and 
validity of this self-reported measure for actual behaviour.  The risk preferences 
reported by the individuals in Year 2004 survey therefore can reflect the 
underlying trait and are relevant for predicting behaviour. Bonin et al. (2006) 
investigate whether risk preferences explain how individuals are sorted into 
occupations with different earning risks and they find that individuals with low 
willingness to take risks are more likely to be sorted into occupations with low 
earning risks. 
I construct a longitudinal data out of German Socio-Economic Panel 
(SOEP). With the longitudinal data, there is sufficient variation to identify the 
individual effects across the time. With panel probit models correcting for auto-
correlated disturbances, I find that bequest motives are quite strong among 
married couples with dependent children. The probability is about 14 percent 
                                                 
23  German tax authorities consider an annuity payment as consisting of two portions. One portion 
is the pay-back of the invested amount of capital and therefore is not subject to taxation as the 
invested capital comes from after-tax income. The second portion is considered as interest and 
thus taxable. 
24 This variable was constructed out of SOEP. See Schwarze (1995) for detailed method. 
25 Payouts will be subject to personal income tax. People aged 60 and above who have invested for 
at least 12 years will get half the payout tax-free. 
 
 46
higher in the whole sample. Being unemployed significantly reduces life 
insurance demand by 2 percent. Housewives are less likely insured. The same is 
for the low-income families. The marginal tax rate is strongly related to the higher 
demand for life insurances. A person who is subject to the average marginal tax 
rate is about 5 percent more likely to buy life insurance than his counterpart who 
is not subject to taxation. I find evidence of the program anticipation effect as well. 
In Year 2003 and 2004, the demand is much higher than the year before after I 
control other factors. Finally, I find that the self-reported risk attitude is positively 
associated with life insurance holdings. The individuals who are inclined to take 
riskier actions are also more likely to sign life insurance contracts.  It implies that 
the self-reported risk attitude captures the individual heterogeneity instead of a 
measure of risk aversion.  The risk-inclined individual utilizes life insurance to 
minimize utility loss out of rationality.  
The rest of this chapter is organized as following. Part 2 presents the 
theoretical model. Part 3 describes the data. Part 4 discusses reduced-form 
estimations and the empirical results. The last part concludes this chapter and 
discusses future research potential. 
 
II. Theoretical Model  
As life insurance is used to insure against the unforeseen mortality risk and 
to provide a way to smooth the consumption for the surviving dependents, it is 
seen as a way of inter-temporally allocating resources. The life cycle model is a 
standard way for the economists to model choices such as consumption, saving, 
labour supply, fertility, etc. Theoretical models of the demand for life insurance 
have been derived by Yaari (1965), Fischer (1973), Campbell (1980), Lewis 
(1989), and Bernheim (1991). The first life cycle model of life insurance was 
proposed by Fischer (1973) to examine the life cycle patterns of consumption, 
savings, and insurance purchases. Winter and Walliser (1998) derives life 
insurance demand in a three-period model with a ‘joy-of-giving’ bequest motives. 
In their paper, life insurance is modelled as a combination of term life insurance 
and a savings plan. As their model incorporates the salient features of the German 
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tax and pension system, I adopt their model as my basic framework and extend to 
allow labour market participation. 
In my model, a representative individual lives T years and maximize the 
expected utility function by choosing consumption, leisure and bequest. I set the 
starting period to be when individual is 20 years old. T is the maximum years the 
individual could live.  In this model, consumption, leisure, bequests are assumed 
to be separable in a constant relative risk aversion (CRRA) utility function.  
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where c is the consumption, l is the leisure, b represents the bequest, γ  is the risk 
aversion parameter of the CRRA utility function, β  is the discount factor, η  is 
the weight on bequest, and π  is the survival probability. Specifically, 0=Tπ  as 
the death at the end of life course is certain.  
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where w is the hourly wage, H usually equals to 24 hours, sτ  is the payroll tax 
that is contributed to German public pension system and returns pensions in old 
age, Lt+1 is the life insurance purchased, Zt is the price of life insurance, St+1 is 
amount invested in bonds, Rc is defined as: )1(1 cc rR τ−+= , with r standing for 
rate of return on bonds and cτ is the capital income tax, R is defined as 1+r,  α  is 
the exogenous savings portion of the life insurance. As the life insurance in this 
model is whole life insurance that combines the term life insurance and a savings 
plan, when the policyholder survives, a fraction of the insurance sum, or the cash 
value, can be withdrawn. 
The official retirement age is 65 and the individual receives pension after 
retirement. Furthermore, the insurance contracts usually allow the insured to cash 
out a balance up to face value of the insurance contract at retirement. Therefore, I 
do not add life insurance in the bequests. In addition, it is reasonable to assume 
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that people do not start buying life insurance when they are old as the premium 
would be too high to offset the benefits. The budget constraint after retirement is 
therefore different from that during the working period.  
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where G equals 1 + g and g is the internal rate of return of the pension system. 
The first order conditions from the maximization problem yields the 
following relationships between the choice variables of consumption, leisure, and 
bequests for those t<65: 
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The maximization can be solved recursively by solving the consumption 
and bequest in the last period and then substituting backwards to the previous 
period.  I will not go further into the algebraic solutions to the model but instead 
simply illustrate the implications of the model. First, life insurance demand 
depends on the weight of bequest motives η . In the empirical model, the marital 
status and number of children in the household can capture the bequest motives. 
Second, demand for life insurance is positively related to income. While labour 
force participation provides a source of income, and labour income uncertainties 
dominate the financial capital income vulnerability, the loss of labour income 
therefore will dampen the demand for life insurance. I examine specifically those 
who lost jobs and those women who exit from the labour force and become 
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housewives. Third, tax parameters certainly cause changes in budget constraint. 
Furthermore from the comparative statics, the increase in cτ , the capital income 
tax rate will increase the Rc and therefore the amount of life insurance increases to 
maintain the smooth consumption stream in different periods. I examine the effect 
of the marginal tax rate on life insurance demand as well the program effect of 
abolishing tax benefits on life insurance. Finally, as the CRRA model implies, the 
risk aversion parameter γ  is positively related to life insurance demand. The 
greater the risk aversion is, the more willing the individual to smooth 
consumption over life cycle, resulting in a higher demand for life insurances. In 
the following sections, I use the GSOEP data to test these theoretical predictions.  
 
III. Data and Descriptive Statistics 
 The data source is German Socio-Economic Panel Studies (SOEP), which 
is equivalent to the Current Population Survey (CPS) in the U.S. The SOEP was 
started in 1984 as a longitudinal survey of private households and persons aged 18 
years and older in the Federal Republic of Germany. It collects a rich array of 
information such as individual characteristics, social backgrounds, economic 
status, religions, personal opinions and attitudes toward some specific topics, etc. 
The original sample includes 4,528 households and all the full-age members in 
each household.  In later years refreshment samples were added.  For example, in 
June 1990, 2,179 households from former German Democratic Republic (GDR) 
were included immediately after the reunion. In 1998, a refreshment sample of 
1,067 households was added and in year 2000, 6,052 additional households were 
added. All the information is collected and stored in separate sub-files for each 
year according to different topics.26  
                                                 
26 Because of this decomposed data structure, both cross sectional and longitudinal analysis 
requires a matching and merging process.  
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 The longitudinal data constructed out to the SOEP from 1994 to 2004 and 
is an unbalanced panel.  Sample members enter in different years and have 
different observations from 2 to 11 years.27  
 In the household questionnaire, the question about what kind of savings or 
investment securities the household owns is asked every year. Life insurance 
holding is one of the options. I extract this information and use it as the key 
dependent variable. One drawback is that I can only observe whether or not the 
sample member has life insurance instead of the detailed contract information 
such like face and cash value of the policies, premium paid, benefit received, etc.  
Therefore, I am measuring the continuous change between 0 and 1, or the 
probability of owning life insurance instead of the quantity purchased. The 
variable of unemployment is the registered unemployment status at the 
unemployment office. Compared with the figures from German Federal Statistics 
Office, it is consistently lower as it omits the unreported unemployment.  
 Creating the marginal tax rate is a complicated process because of the 
complex German tax laws. I adopt the same set of simplifying assumptions as did 
Schwarze (1995): all married persons file jointly; all filing units take the standard 
deduction; no filing unit itemizes; when no standard deduction exists the 
allowance is ignored; average national insurance contribution rates for old age 
pensions, health insurance and unemployment insurance apply to all employees. I 
incorporate all the changes of tax laws from Year 1994 to Year 2004 into tax 
functions, from which the key explanatory variable - marginal tax is generated. 28 
The relationship between marginal tax rate and the pre-tax income are plotted29 in 
Figure 2.1. As it roughly shows, the higher pre-tax income is associated with 
higher marginal tax rate.  
 The final longitudinal data consists of 132,144 observations across the 
period of 1994 to 2004. I restrict the sample to the population between 20 and 65 
years old as the incentives to start life insurance contracts after retirement age is 
                                                 
27 The data structure is as followed: 970 in 1995;  498 in 1996; 443 in 1997; 1800 in 1998; 501 in 
1999; 10216 in 2000;674 in 2001; 2774 in 2002;  665 in 2003, 579 in 2004. 
28 Marginal tax rate is defined as the first derivative of the tax function. 
29 I use Year 2004 data only. 
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low due to the high premium. Table 2.1 summarizes the main variables I use in 
empirical analysis. The unadjusted mean of life insurance holdings is around 65 
percent. The mean age is 44 year old. The average education level is around 12 
year.  Around 5 percent of the sample report that they are still in education or 
training. Due to the matching process of household and personal level information, 
the sample has around 74 percent married individuals.30 Roughly 9 percent are 
registered as unemployed at the unemployment office. Seven percent are self-
employed and 18 percent are working as civil servants. The average marginal tax 
rate is about 22 percent. Forty-five percent reported being a home owner and 28 
percent reported having mortgage.31 The average reported satisfaction with self 
health is about 6.7 out of an 11 point scale. The average risk preference is around 
4.5 out of an 11 point scale. 
I calculate the transition probability of life insurance holdings. This 
transition probability is unconditional on any explanatory variables. Across the 
11-year period, the probability is around 22 percent for becoming the owner of a 
life insurance contract and 13 percent for cancelling the contracts. It roughly 
presents a dynamic picture of life insurance demand in the longitudinal data.  
  To present a more detailed picture on life insurance holdings, I group the 
sample members according to the labour force status, family structure and income 
quartiles.  Figure 2.2 provides the comparison between the unemployed and 
employed. I see a clear gap between these two groups across the time. For the 
employed, the life insurance holdings stay quite stable and above 55 percent. For 
the unemployed, it is not only much lower but also decreasing slightly across time, 
from 52 percent in Year 1994 to 45 percent in Year 2004. Does it mean that the 
unemployed are worse off under Harz labour market reform 32 ? The welfare 
                                                 
30 The household questionnaire is mainly directed to the head of the household or someone who 
can stand for the head. Therefore, the variable life insurance is at the household level. I merge 
the household and personal level information in such a way that only the person reported as the 
head or the partner are included. 
31 Some banks require that the individual should own life insurance when applying for mortgages 
due to the liquidity concern. 
32 Harz I and II began to take effect in  Year 2003, and Harz III in Year 2004. 
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change of those unemployed people is naturally an interesting topic worthy of 
political attention.  
 Bequest motives could be roughly illustrated by Figure 2.3 and 2.4. Figure 
2.3 shows the comparison of life insurance holdings between the married and not 
married individuals. The married individuals appear to be concerned about their 
spouse’s living standard. The gap between percent of life insurance holdings 
among the married and not married is around 20 percent. Figure 2.4 shows the 
difference of life insurance holdings between households with children and those 
without children. Despite the slightly upward trend for the households with 
children, the rates are quite stable across the time. The gap between these two 
groups is about 10 percent. Apparently, the parents are altruistic and concerned 
about the welfare of their descendents.  
 Figure 2.5 displays the pattern of life insurance holdings across the 4 
income quartiles. Clearly life insurance is a normal good. Higher income is related 
to higher life insurance holdings across years. The largest gap exists between 
those in the lowest quartile and those in the second quartile. The percent of having 
life insurance is nearly doubled in the later group. Both of these two group show 
slightly decreasing holding rates across time.  The increasing number of life 
insurance contracts signed mainly comes from the groups that have higher than 
average income. Moreover, the story of tax advantages might help explain the 
higher demand among the high-income earners. As their marginal tax rates are 
higher, the motives to buy life insurance to utilize the tax deductibles are higher.  
 
IV. Reduced-Form Estimations and Empirical Findings 
As the theoretical model implies, demand for life insurance is a function of 
the implicit price of the insurance, household’s risk aversion, the accumulated 
wealth, labour force participation, the household’s weights on bequests, and tax 
parameters. In the empirical analysis I use reduced form estimation. 
I start with a baseline equation: 
(1)    TtNixay ititit ,....,1;,....,1, ==++= υβ  
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where yit and xit are observations for the ith individual at time t and β  is a vector 
of coefficients. Specifically, in my empirical analysis, yit is the dummy of life 
insurance holding where 1 indicates having life insurance and 0 having none).  xit 
is a set of explanatory variables including sex, age and age squared, education 
level, education or training status, marital status, number of children, housewife 
status, house owner, mortgage holder, whether unemployed or self-employed,  
whether working as civil servant, net labour income and labour income squared, 
and marginal tax rate. I also add the subjective measure of satisfaction of self-
health to test the existence of adverse selection into life insurance holdings. If 
adverse selection is present, then I would expect that the person who is less 
satisfactory with one’s own health would be more likely to buy life insurance. In 
reality, the insurance company usually checks the applicant’s health status 
carefully. Therefore adverse selection may not be serious. I control the cohorts, 
nationalities, and each of the 16 states as well. In the empirical estimate for Year 
2004 cross sectional data, the self reported risk attitude is added to control for 
individual heterogeneity.  
The bequest motives are modelled in marital status, number of children 
and the interaction term between the dummy of married and the dummy of having 
children at home. Unemployment and housewife status capture the effect of exit 
from the labour force. The self-employed and civil servants are subjected to 
different treatment from German tax and the public pension system: the self-
employed are not obliged to contribute to the public pension system but must 
provide for their own retirement income and survivor’s benefits; civil servants 
with tenure do not need to contribute to the pensions but receive quite generous 
survivor benefits. Tax preference is modelled by the marginal tax rate variable.  
In the baseline equation, itυ  is the residual with mean zero and variance νσ .  
It is assumed to be uncorrelated with x, and there is no autocorrelation.  This is the 
easiest and most convenient assumption about the error structure. Pooled OLS is 
used to estimate the simplified model. In doing so, I pool cross-sectional time 
series, which incorporates both the cross-sectional effect of x on life insurance 
demand as well as the time series effect. All the individuals in the data are 
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characterised by the same regression equation (1) at all points in time. However, it 
turns out the pooled cross sectional time series is quite difficult to estimate. 
Pooled OLS in most cases fails to perform this task. As Hicks (1994) points out, 
the error terms from pooled OLS regression tend to be temporally autoregressive, 
cross-sectional heteroscedastic and correlated and may conceal unit and time 
effects. Table 2.2 displays the Wooldridge test for serial correlation from the 
regression of the first differences and yields an F statistics of 374.59. Therefore 
the OLS regression leads to inefficient estimates.  
There are three ways the current econometric literature dealing with 
autocorrelation. The first one is a static model, in which autocorrelation is 
regarded as a nuisance in the residuals and has to be corrected. The second one is 
a dynamic model, in which autocorrelation is treated as persistency in the 
dependent variable and is captured by modelling an autoregressive process 
including a lagged dependent variable. In the third approach, autocorrelation in 
pooled time series is regarded as resulting from unit roots in the single series and 
is can be corrected by differencing the series33. 
I use the static approach where the error structure follows a first-order 
autoregressive or AR(1) process:  
(2)     TtNiexay itiitit ,....,1;,....,1, ==+++= μβ  
where 
           ittiit zee += −1,ρ  
and where the absolute value of the autocorrelation parameter, ρ , is less 
than 1 and itz  is independent and identically distributed with zero mean and 
variance 2zσ .  The disturbances are modelled as a first-order autoregressive 
process.34  In this random effects model, iμ  are independent of itx  and assumed 
to be realizations of an i.i.d process with mean zero and variance 2zσ
35.  The 
Breusch-Pagan lagrange multiplier test (see Table 2.2) on the absence of random 
                                                 
33 See Wooldridge (2003) Ch.13. 
34 This can be implemented by Stata program with a random effects GLS regression.  
35 I assume there is no between group autocorrelation. 
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effect yields a test statistic of 1883.49, which exceeds by far the 95 percent critical 
value for a chi-squared statistic with one degree of freedom, 3.84. Without 
question the random effect model fits better than the pooled OLS with the data. 
Moreover, I perform the Hausman specification test on the model fit of the fixed 
effect model versus the random effect model. The null hypothesis that the fixed 
effect model fits better is rejected with the highly significant test statistic of 
727.87. 
As the dependent variable is a dummy which takes value of 0 and 1, the 
linear probability model is not the most satisfactory one as it can generate a 
probability that is either greater than one or less than zero. It also implies a 
constant marginal effect of each explanatory variable that appears in its original 
form. To avoid the linear probability model’s problem, I proceed to explore the 
panel probit model that also takes into account the autoregressive error structure. 
The model can be written as follows: 
(3)     TtNivxay ititit ,....,1;,....,1,
* ==++= β     
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The disturbances itv are normally distributed with a T×T positive definite 
covariance matrix Σ. The typical element of Σ is denoted σts. In the empirical 
estimation, however, I do not restrict the error structure to be AR(1) process but 
instead as an unstructured one. xit are assumed throughout to be strictly exogenous, 
which implies that Cov[xit,vjs] = 0 across all individuals i and j and all periods t 
and s. This rule out state persistence or the presence of lagged dependent variables 
on the right hand side. 
The results of the random effect model with AR (1) errors are displayed in 
Table 2.2 and the results of the panel probit model with marginal effects are 
displayed in Table 2.3. Both models yield consistent results except that most of 
the estimates from the panel probit model are slightly larger in magnitude.  
The probability of life insurance holdings depends nonlinearly on age and 
income as captured by the negative coefficients on their squared terms. 
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Graphically, it exhibits a hump shape in age and income. This is consistent with 
the previous research results on the relationship between life insurance holdings 
and age and income. I control the cohort effects in both models as well.  The 
results indicate that the younger cohorts are less likely to own life insurance, 
whereas the cohorts born between 1940s’ and 1960s’ are more likely to purchase 
life insurance. In other words, individuals age 30 to 60 during the study period 
have a greater tendency to purchase life insurance after controlling for other 
factors. 
The bequest motives are clear in life insurance holdings. Married couples 
are more likely to own life insurance than single people. The probability increases 
when married couple have children. It is about 14 percent more likely that a 
married couple with a child has life insurance than its single counterpart. The 
number of children appears to have a slightly negative impact on life insurance 
holdings. The presence of a dependent child at home positively affects the bequest 
motive.  More children means the parents face tighter financial constraints but 
also unofficially guarantees care when parents get older.  
Life insurance holdings are significantly lower among the unemployed: 
approximately 2.3 percent and 2.4 percent in the random effects model and panel 
probit model, respectively. Housewives are significantly less likely insured. Those 
who are still in studying or training and are not yet in the labour force are less 
likely to have life insurance, probably due to the decreased financial ability to buy 
life insurance.  The self-employed are about 5 percent more likely to have life 
insurance. As the self-employed must provide their own pensions and survivor 
benefits, they are more prone to purchasing life insurance.  I did not find any 
significant effect in either model on owning life insurance among civil servants, 
as they usually enjoy generous survivor benefits provided by the government. 
Tax incentives are highlighted by the significant coefficient of the 
marginal tax rate. Marginal effects are 23.9 and 22.5 percent in RE and panel 
probit models, respectively. In other words, if a person is subject to an average 
marginal tax rate of 22 percent (each extra dollar earned is taxed at a rate of 22 
percent), then the probability is 5 percent higher than if he were subject to zero tax. 
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As the life insurance payments were enjoying tax-free treatment, a higher 
marginal tax rate provides a stronger incentive to take advantage of tax 
preferences towards life insurance. Anticipation of the tax benefit abolishment on 
contracts signed after 2004 speed up people’s decision to own life insurance.  In 
later analysis, I investigate this program anticipation effect two years prior to the 
implementation of new rules.  
I find that home owners, especially those with mortgages from banks are 5 
to 6 percent more likely to buy life insurance. As mentioned before, some banks 
require that applicants have life insurance contracts before approval of loans in 
case of default.  
Another interesting variable is the subjective measure of satisfaction with 
self health. It has small but significant positive effects in both models. People who 
are more satisfied with their own health are more likely to have life insurance. 
This is closely related to the operating mechanism of insurance companies so that 
they check the health status of applicants very carefully upon signing contracts.  
People who are in bad health situation are less likely to get approved. There is no 
adverse selection into life insurance, as previous literature indicates. 
I control for cohorts, nationality and each of the 16 states in both models. 
Individuals with German nationality have a stronger tendency to buy life 
insurance than foreigners living in Germany, such as those from Turkey, Italy, 
Greek and other countries. Controlling for each of the 16 states shows that, in 
general, West Germans are less likely to purchase life insurance than their East 
German counterparts.  
Table 2.4 reports results of a probit model specifically run for the 2004 
sample in order to examine the relevance of the subjective measure of risk 
preferences in life insurance demand. This self-reported risk variable appears to 
be statistically insignificant in explaining life insurance holdings.  However, using 
only the 2004 sample has a disadvantage in that it is cross sectional data and 
therefore lacks personal variation across the time used for properly identifying the 
effect of risk attitudes. I construct another dataset that contains an observation 
period from 2002 to 2004 and simply traces back the risk attitude, as it is unusual 
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that the individual changes risk attitudes frequently during this three-year period. I 
then find a small but significant positive effect (see Table 2.4). This self-reported 
risk attitude captures the individual heterogeneity across time. Some previous 
studies find that individuals reporting higher risk preferences are more likely to 
take risky actions such as portfolio choice, self-employment, mobility, etc. 
Therefore, it could be positively related to behaviour in holding life insurance. 
Life insurance has certain tax advantages as shown by the effect of the 
marginal tax rate on the demand for life insurance. However, tax benefits are 
being abolished on contracts signed after Dec.31, 2004. The German government 
started to discuss this issue early in 2003.  How would the public respond to the 
potential change in tax policies to life insurance? Would those without life 
insurance start shopping around to catch the bus? I run a separate panel probit 
model of life insurance demand based on data from 2002 to 2004 to approximate 
the program anticipation effect. Like before, I control for self-reported risk 
attitudes. I find that purchasing life insurance increases in 2003 and 2004 
compared with 2002, when policy discussions had not yet started. It confirms the 
anticipation effect of the policy change on people’s behaviour. In 2003 the 
increase was about 17 percent, and in 2004 18 percent compared with 200236. 
Both appear to be statistically significant at the 1 percent level. To evaluate the 
program more precisely, it is important to obtain the data after 2004. This outside 
of the data range and would be an interesting research topic once the data of a 
longer post-ante period is available.  
 
V. Conclusion 
 As life insurance is an important component of a household’s private 
savings in Germany, understanding the decision to hold life insurance sheds some 
light on life-cycle savings behaviour. This chapter studies the demand for life 
insurance in Germany by examining the driving forces behind the demand 
behaviour.  
                                                 
36 The regression results are upon the request. 
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The theoretic model is a life cycle model that incorporates the specific 
features of the German tax and pension system. I test theoretical predictions of the 
impacts of bequest motives, labour market participation, and tax advantages on 
the demand for life insurance using German SOEP data. In addition, I examine the 
program anticipation effect of abolishment of the tax benefit. And I utilize self-
reported risk attitudes to capture individual heterogeneity across time as well.  
The panel probit model, which takes care of the nature of dummy 
dependent variables, produces slightly larger marginal effects than the random 
effects model. In general, I find that bequest motives are quite strong among 
married families with children. It is around 14 percent more than their single 
counterparts without any children. The unemployed are consistently less likely to 
be insured in the samples. The same is true for housewives, people in still in 
school or training and low-income families. Higher marginal tax rates provide 
individual incentives to buy life insurance. The anticipation of the abolishment of 
tax benefits on life insurance increases the demand prior to the real change. 
Moreover, I find self-reported risk attitudes turn out to be positively related with 
life insurance holdings.  
 Although the data allowed us only to examine the possibility of holding 
life insurance, it could be interesting to obtain a dataset which would enables us to 
examine the quantity demanded. This would require a different dataset that 
records more detailed life insurance holdings such as the type of the contracts, the 
monthly or yearly premium, amount insured for, etc. Further research could also 
utilize the GSOEP data released after 2005 in order to perform program 
evaluations on the policy change of tax treatments on life insurance.   
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Figure 2.1: Relationship between Marginal Tax Rate and Income 
Year 2004 Sample 
 
 
 
Figure 2.2: Comparison of LI Holdings between 
the Employed and Unemployed 
1994-2004 
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Figure 2.3: Comparison of LI Holdings between 
the Married and not Married 
1994-2004 
 
 
 
Figure 2.4: Comparison of LI Holdings between 
Households with & without Children 
1994-2004 
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Figure 2.5: Comparison of LI Holdings across 4 Income Quartiles 
1994-2004 
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Table 2.1: Summary Statistics of Main Variables 
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Life Insurance Holding 0,646 0,478 0 1 
Age 43,978 11,750 20 65 
Male 0,476 0,499 0 1 
Education level 11,913 2,617 7 18 
Still in education or training 0,049 0,216 0 1 
Married 0,741 0,438 0 1 
Number of children 0,735 1,000 0 10 
Housewife 0,365 0,482 0 1 
Unemployed 0,087 0,282 0 1 
Self-employed 0,068 0,251 0 1 
Civil Servant 0,179 0,384 0 1 
House owner 0,450 0,497 0 1 
Mortgage 0,279 0,448 0 1 
Net labour income 19731,69 19687,15 0 146350 
Marginal tax rate 0,222 0,143 0 0,53 
Satisfaction with own health 6,713 2,147 0 10 
Risk Attitude from 0 to 10 4,528 2,278 0 10 
Nationality German 0,883 0,322 0 1 
Nationality Turkey 0,040 0,197 0 1 
Nationality Italy 0,019 0,137 0 1 
Nationality Greek 0,012 0,111 0 1 
Nationality Ex-Yugoslavia 0,012 0,109 0 1 
Cohort born in 1930s’ 0,107 0,309 0 1 
Cohort born in 1940s’ 0,189 0,392 0 1 
Cohort born in 1950s’ 0,232 0,422 0 1 
Cohort born in 1960s’ 0,256 0,437 0 1 
Cohort born in 1970s’ 0,099 0,299 0 1 
Cohort born in 1980s’ 0,008 0,090 0 1 
Note:   Sample period is from 1994 to 2004. 
The variable ‘Net labour income’ refers to the individual labour income. I exclude the 
highest one income percentile. 
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Source: German Socio-economic Panel (1994-2004) 
Note:   Breusch Pagan lagrange multiplier test on absence of random effects: H0 : var( iμ ) = 0. 
Baltagi-Wu LBI is the Baltagi-Wu (1999) locally best invariant test statistic from the 
AR(1) model, H0 : rρ  = 0;  rρ is estimated error autocorrelation coefficient.  
Hausman test is Hausman's (1978) specification test of the appropriateness of fixed 
effect model. Wooldridge test for serial correlation from the regression of the first-
differences variables, H0 : no first-order autocorrelation. 
The other four biggest nationalities in the data are Turkey, Greece, Italy, Ex-Yugoslavia. 
*** means significant at the level of 1% .** means significant at the level of 5%. * 
means significant at the level of 10%
Table 2.2: Random Effect model of Life Insurance Demand  
with AR(1) Disturbances 
Explanatory Variables Coefficient 
Age 0,017*** 
Age squared -0,000*** 
Male -0,011** 
Education level 0,005*** 
Still in education or training -0,023*** 
Married 0,121*** 
Number of children -0,007*** 
Married*children 0,021*** 
Housewife -0,010** 
Unemployed -0,023*** 
Self-employed 0,047*** 
Civil Servant 0,005 
House owner 0,016*** 
Having mortgage 0,036*** 
Net labour income 1.81e-06*** 
Net labour income squared  -6.48e-12*** 
Marginal tax rate 0,239*** 
Satisfaction with own health 0,002*** 
Constant -0,078** 
5 biggest nationalities Controlled 
Cohorts Controlled 
16 states controlled 
# of observations 132144 
Wald Chi2 5894,37 
Breusch Pagan 1883,49 
Baltagi-Wu LBI 1,97 
Hausman test  727,87 
Woodridge test  374,586 
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Table 2.3: Panel Probit model of Life Insurance Demand  
with Correlated Errors 
Explanatory Variables Coefficients Marg. effect 
Age 0,053*** 0,020*** 
Age squared -0,001*** -0,000*** 
Male -0,033** -0,012** 
Education level 0,016*** 0,006*** 
Still in education or training -0,059*** -0,022*** 
Married 0,327*** 0,124*** 
Number of children -0,021** -0,008** 
Married*children 0,077*** 0,028*** 
Housewife -0,029** -0,011** 
Unemployed -0,064*** -0,024*** 
Self-employed 0,141*** 0,051*** 
Civil Servant 0,018 0,007 
House owner 0,048*** 0,018*** 
Having mortgage 0,116*** 0,043*** 
Net labour income 4,92E-06*** 1.83e-06*** 
Net labour income 2 -1,09E-11 -4.05e-12 
Marginal tax rate 0,606*** 0,225*** 
Satisfaction with own health 0,006*** 0,002*** 
Constant -1,728*** --- 
5 biggest nationalities controlled 
Cohorts controlled 
16 states controlled 
# of observations 132144 
Wald chi2 4406.04 
Source: German Socio-economic Panel (1994-2004). 
Note:  Marginal effects for dummy variables are calculated for discrete change from 0 to 1.  
 *** means significant at the level of 1% 
 ** means significant at the level of 5% 
* means significant at the level of 10%
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Source: German Socio-economic Panel (2002-2004).  
Note:  Marginal effects for dummy variables are calculated for discrete change from 0 to 1.  
*** means significant at the level of 1%. ** means significant at the level of 5%. *means significant 
at the level of 10% 
Table 2.4: Probit Model of Life Insurance Demand with Risk Measure 
2004 Sample 
(Probit) 
2002-2004 Sample 
(Panel Probit) 
Explanatory Variables 
Coefficients Marg. effect Coefficients Marg. effect 
Age 0,052*** 0,019*** 0,061*** 0,022*** 
Age squared -0,001*** -0,000*** -0,001*** -0,000*** 
Male -0,047* -0,017* -0,021 -0,007 
Education level 0,011** 0,004** 0,013*** 0,005*** 
Still in education or training -0,071 -0,026 -0,083*** -0,030*** 
Married 0,393*** 0,148*** 0,411*** 0,153*** 
Number of children -0,047** -0,017** -0,065*** -0,023*** 
Married*children 0,042 0,015 0,114*** 0,041*** 
Housewife -0,077** -0,028** 0,007 0,003 
Unemployed -0,178*** -0,067*** -0,063*** -0,023*** 
Self-employed 0,180*** 0,064*** 0,101*** 0,036*** 
Civil Servant 0,007 0,003 -0,013 -0,005 
House owner 0,219*** 0,080*** 0,241*** 0,087*** 
Having mortgage 0,085** 0,031** 0,051** 0,018** 
Net labour income 1,52E-06 5.59e-07 5,89E-06*** 2,12E-06*** 
Net labour income 2 7,66E-12 2.81e-12 -3,38E-11*** -1,22E-11***
Marginal tax rate 1,436*** 0,527*** 0,703*** 0,253*** 
Satisfaction with own health 0,010** 0,004** 0,003 0,001 
Risk attitude in 2004 sample 0,008 0,003 --- --- 
Risk attitude in 2002-2004 sample --- --- 0,018*** 0,007*** 
Year 2003 --- --- 0,49281*** 0,17381*** 
Year2004 --- --- 0,52081*** 0,181*** 
Constant -1,877*** --- -1,857*** --- 
5 biggest nationalities controlled 
Cohorts -- 
16 states controlled 
# of observations 14205 45085 
Test Statistics Log likelihood: -8197.7024 Wald chi2:  2074.35 
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C h a p t e r  T h r e e  
 
 
 
 
Risk Selection and Inefficient Provision of  
Supplementary Health Insurance in Germany 
 
 
 
The rising health expenditure and increasingly constrained public 
resources in Germany has led to several reform packages in recent 
decades. Due to the cuts in benefits and coverage in the statutory 
health insurance market, more and more publicly-insured members 
purchase supplementary health insurance through the private market 
in order to cover the unforeseen risks. However, using the data from 
German Socio-Economic Panel Studies, I find clear evidence of risk 
selection and inefficient provision of supplementary health insurance 
in the private health insurance market. Controlling for the 
measurement problem of self-reported health status in my empirical 
models, I find that poorer health status is negatively related with the 
purchase of supplementary health insurance, especially those plans 
covering hospital stays. The findings in this chapter have important 
implications for the current debate on patient’s data protection if the 
government aims to improve the efficiency of the private health 
insurance market in providing supplementary coverage. 
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I. Introduction 
Health care expenditures have been increasing and slowly draining public 
resources in many countries. In the case of Germany, about 158 billion Euro were 
spent on health in 1992. The figure rose to 201 billion in 1998 and 234 billion in 
2004. Health expenditures per inhabitant in Germany rose from 1960 Euro in 
1992 to 2840 Euro in 200437. Policy makers and health economist have been 
searching for suitable alternatives to finance health care.  
An observed trend of health care reforms in industrialised countries is 
introducing a mixed health insurance system, where public health care requires 
patient co-payments for services. This is well illustrated by Zweifel and Breyer 
(1997). A mixed public/private health insurance system is also modelled in some 
recent research.38 Several OECD countries' governments consider supplementary 
health insurance as one of the primary instruments for limiting statutory financing 
of health care.39  
A very early study of the demand for supplementary health insurance can 
be found in Newhouse et al. (1977). Their paper mainly focused on the model 
incorporating tax subsidies. 40  Seidman (1978) developed a criterion for the 
optimal treatment of supplementary health insurance under income-related major-
risk (catastrophic) national health insurance (MR-NHI) and used it to derive the 
optimal treatment under an MR-NHI proposal that may be enacted in U.S.A. 
Petretto (1999) has developed a theoretical framework of National Health Service 
where compulsory social insurance covers a package of essentials and 
supplementary private policy tops up the remaining services. In his paper the 
model was solved by backward induction with a three stage maximization process, 
and the conditions for optimal rates for social insurance coverage and private 
coinsurance are analysed. In equilibrium, the private insurance contract signed by 
each individual includes a coinsurance rate which is a function of social payroll 
                                                 
37 Source: the Federal Health Monitoring system, http://www.gbe-bund.de 
38 For example see Blomqvist and Johansson (1997). 
39 Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development. Private health insurance in OECD 
countries. The OECD Health Project. OECD, 2004. 
40 They show that the demand for supplementing outpatient services will be small unless the tax 
subsidy of insurance is continued. 
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tax and social insurance rate. The optimal social insurance coverage positively 
depends on the distributional characteristics of health services and also the 
individual’s gains from risk-sharing, that is, out-of-pocket health expenditures.  
In many industrialised countries with a National Health Service System 
such as Germany, the principle of funding statutory health care is based the 
concept of solidarity - the belief that society is responsible for the well-being of its 
members.  This means the contributions are made according to ability to pay and 
people receive benefits according their health care needs. However, as pointed out 
by van de Ven et. al (2006),  in most voluntary supplementary health insurance 
markets these institutional and regulatory arrangements, adopted by governments 
with the aim of guaranteeing solidarity, are formally absent. In the long run, the 
absence of these legal constraints may induce insurers to risk-rate premiums in 
order to attract the better risks and thereby increase their competitiveness and 
profits. In Germany, health insurance companies can quite easily identify different 
risks through full access to patients’ data. Meanwhile, the insurers have no 
obligation to enrol any applicant who needs some sort of supplementary health 
insurance. The optimal strategy for profit-maximizing insurers is to design 
selection techniques to insure good risks and exclude bad risks. Risk selection 
techniques include selective underwriting, benefits package design, selective 
advertising, denial of coverage, exclusion of pre-existing medical conditions, 
differential waiting periods, termination of contract, etc. 
The purpose of this chapter is two-fold. First of all, I attempt to confirm 
the existence of risk selection in the supplementary health insurance market with 
the empirical data. Second, econometrically I aim to control the endogeneity 
problem of the self-reported health status to obtain more accurate estimates of its 
effect on supplementary health insurance holding.  
There are few empirical studies concerning the demand for supplementary 
health insurance in Germany. Christoph (2002) used German Social-Economic 
Panel (GSOEP) data to study the demand for supplementary private health 
insurance among compulsory members. They find that better health status is 
related to a higher probability of having supplementary health insurance. Their 
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argument is that people with bad health may face more restrictions when applying 
for supplementary health insurance. Their bad health results in either higher 
premiums or a rejection of their application. However, their model doesn’t take 
into account measurement error in health status and therefore the estimated effect 
of health is biased. 
Health status is an important variable in studying the demand for health 
insurance. As indicated in the health economics literature, adverse selection is an 
important phenomenon of the health insurance market. Adverse selection occurs 
since high risks tend to consume more insurance than low risks in a market with 
asymmetric information and favours the buyer.41 Health economists quite often 
use the individual health status in empirical models to test for the existence of 
adverse selection in the insurance market. 42  If good health is related to the 
purchase of less health insurance while bad health is to the higher amounts of 
insurance, all else being equal, adverse selection is present.  
In survey questions, the respondents are often asked to rate their own 
health. However, the direct application of self-assessed health status is usually 
questionable due to measurement error. An early analysis by Angel and Gronfein 
(1988) demonstrated that the social construction of such subjective information 
makes its use in comparative analysis problematic since both its accuracy and the 
outcome for which it is employed as a predictor are influenced by the 
respondent’s culture and social location. A recent study by Crossley and Kennedy 
(2002) on the reliability of self-assessed health shows that there is substantial 
error in rating and this error is highly correlated with observable variable such as 
age, gender and income. Therefore, simply employing the self-reported health 
status from German Social-Economic Panel would result in an incorrect estimate 
of the effect of health status on social outcomes of interest.  
From German Social-Economic Panel data I select wave 2002 and wave 
2004 and construct a balanced panel. Using the predicted health status instead of 
the self-reported health, I found that worse health status is negatively related to 
                                                 
41 See for example Pauley (1974), Brown (1992). 
42 See Brown (1992). He used self-reported health status in National Medical Care Expenditures 
Survey to test for adverse selection in the individual medical expense insurance market.  
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the holdings of supplementary health insurance and the amount of purchase. 
While this study did not find any evidence of adverse selection in the private 
health insurance market in terms of providing supplementary coverage, it does 
confirm the existence of risk selection in this market. Furthermore I examine the 
holdings of supplementary coverage for hospital stays as incurring hospital care 
can greatly impact household financial status. I found clear evidence of risk 
selection as well.  
The rest of this chapter is organized as follows. Part two provides a brief 
on the institutional background in Germany. Part three presents the empirical 
models I use in the estimation. Part four describes the dataset I construct out of 
GSOEP. Part five discusses the empirical results. Conclusion can be found in Part 
six.  
 
II. Institution Background of German Health Insurance System 
In order to understand the driving forces behind the purchase of 
supplementary health insurance, some background knowledge about the 
institutional setup in the German health insurance system is important. Statutory 
health insurance (referred as public health insurance) is a centrepiece of the 
German welfare state. Approximately 70 million out of a total population of 82 
million people are covered by the statutory health insurance. Only a relatively 
small number of persons- about 300,000 are uninsured. The rest of the population 
are covered by the private health insurance.43  
Solidarity is one important principle of the statutory health insurance, and 
it means the funding of health care and access to it are based on the ability to pay 
and the need of health care. The contribution to the statutory health care system is 
proportional to individual’s gross income which is under an income ceiling. For 
example, in 2006 the average contribution rate of statutory health insurance was 
about 13.4 percent, which is shared equally by the employer and the employee. 
The upper income ceiling for the contribution to the statutory health care system 
                                                 
43 Federal Health Monitoring system, http://www.gbe-bund.de 
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is 42,750 Euro.44 Private health insurance, on the other hand, charges a premium 
according to the individual risk and the actual coverage purchased.  
Statutory health insurance is characterized by the large volume of 
interpersonal redistribution, as the contribution and benefits are actually de-linked. 
It is also a family insurance, which automatically covers the children and a non-
employed spouse without any additional charge. They enjoy the same benefits as 
the paying members. Subject to certain conditions, the statutory system also 
covers pensioners, the unemployed, trainees and students. The publicly insured 
members have the opportunity to obtain the additional coverage in the private 
insurance market.  
Since 1980s’, many health care reforms have been seen in Germany in an 
attempt to control soaring costs. In particular, the reform packages in 1997 
contained several provisions that intended to control public health expenditures 
and increase revenues. Cash benefits to sick employees were reduced and the 
access to treatments at spas was restricted. Higher co-payments were demanded 
from patients. For example, the co-payment per day of in-patient care increased 
from 5 DM to 17 DM per day and additionally for a maximum of 14 days per year. 
And some recent reforms have increased the co-payment per day to 10 Euro 
(roughly equal to 20 DM) and for a maximum of 28 days. Since 2006, public 
health insurance no longer covers glasses either. Private health insurance 
companies provide a variety of supplementary contracts which cover hospital 
stays that are longer than the maximum set by public insurance funds, dental 
services and corrective devices that are outside the coverage provided by public 
insurance funds, as well as a period of travelling abroad, and other kinds of 
service such as visiting medical practitioners which do not belong to the 
traditional schools of medicine that is contracted by public insurance funds.   
 German laws and regulations enable a high degree of transparency in 
market information. In general the applicant must fill out their health declaration 
form when filling out the application form for supplementary health insurance in 
the private health insurance market. They must describe their pre-existing health 
                                                 
44 http://www.versicherungsnetz.de/ 
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conditions, such as cancer, and these pre-existing conditions are of great concern 
for the insurer. They are asked how their general health is in the last 5 years, and 
specifically in last 10 years whether there were some operation or surgery in the 
hospital and how long the hospital stay was.  This is the so-called look-back 
period. If the applicant received medical advice, recommendations, prescription 
drugs, diagnosis, or treatment for a health problem during the look-back period, 
he or she is considered to have a pre-existing condition. The applicant cannot lie 
about his health history as the private health insurance companies can always 
access his information through the family doctor or other ways. Then the private 
health insurance companies will classify the applicant into high or low risk and 
decide whether to reject the application or adjust the premium according to the 
individual’s risk.  
 Starting the end of 2006, the political discussion began about whether the 
patient’s data should be protected from health insurance companies and the 
applicant should have the right to keep his information. If the new policy passed 
to protect the patients’ records, private health insurance cannot detect the type of 
the applicant as easily. Risk selection will be restricted. It is possible that the 
companies will have some mechanism to design the contract in such way to attain 
a separating equilibrium or pooling equilibrium45 under the new circumstances. 
However, in this chapter I mainly focus on the risk selection of current market. 
Further potential problems of adverse selection and moral hazard arising under the 
new circumstances are outside of the scope of this study.  
 
III. Empirical  Model  
In this study I am modelling the holding, not the demand, of 
supplementary health insurance. As mentioned in Part II, private health insurance 
companies are not obliged to provide supplementary coverage to all applicants. 
Due to this risk selection, we can only observe those contracts closed by the 
insurer and the insured in our GSOEP data and we do not have any information 
                                                 
45 A separating equilibrium is characterized by the low risks and high risks purchasing different 
contract while a pooling equilibrium is characterized by a subsidy of high risks insurance 
coverage by low risks. 
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about whether the individual has applied for the supplementary coverage. In this 
sense, we actually do not observe the demand but instead just the actual holding 
status. As the rejection rate shall be greater than zero, there must be excess 
demand for supplementary health insurance in the private health insurance market.  
The following equation models the holdings of supplementary health 
insurance: 
 
(1a)   itititit hxy εαβ ++= *1
*     t=1, 2 and i=1….N 
 
where *ity  is an unobserved latent variable for supplementary health insurance. In 
our data we observe ity  which equals to 1 (having supplementary health insurance) 
or 0 (having no supplementary health insurance). 
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In this case a panel probit model is fitted to estimate the probability of 
holding status. We observe the purchase quantity of *ity in our data as well,  
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In this case a panel tobit model or truncated regression can be applied to 
explain how the quantity purchased varies across different characteristics. itx  is a 
set of exogenous variables which have controls such as age, gender, family status, 
job type, etc.  
In equation (1a), ith , which denotes self-reported health status, is the 
important variable of interest. Not only is this variable related closely to the 
motivation of purchasing supplementary health insurance, econometrically it is 
complicated by the endogeneity problem, which is a consequence of measurement 
error.  
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In GSOEP data, the respondents are asked to rate their own health on a 5-
point scale where 1 means excellent, 2 good, 3 satisfactory, 4 poor, 5 bad. This 
categorical variable gives rise to the endogeneity problem as actual health is 
continuous instead of discrete. Therefore the discrete variable measures health 
with error.  
Besides the fact that the discrete measure of health status gives rise to the 
measurement error, another concern with self-reported health is that respondents 
may have different reference points as to how they judge their health. Therefore 
there exists a gap between true health and the reported health where the reporting 
behaviour differs among respondents with different characteristics. For example, 
Crossley and Kennedy (2002) examine the reliability of self-assessed health using 
Australia data. They find that the measurement error is strongly related to the 
observable variables such as age, gender, income and etc46. Groot (2000) and Van 
Doorslaer & Gerdtham (2003) find that older respondents tend to have a "milder" 
view of their health and tend to rate their health as better than otherwise 
comparable younger respondents. In other words, the perception of what is "good 
health" varies across different age groups. This perception can be also varied 
between the rich and poor, employed and unemployed, optimistic and pessimistic 
individuals.  
Let *ith  denote the true health status and ith the reported health status. The 
true relationship between these two can be written as: 
ititit hh μ+=
*  
Assuming itμ  is uncorrelated with the true health status, i.e, that itμ  is 
completely random, then we are facing a classic measurement error problem. 
Equation (1a) now becomes: 
 
(1a’)   ititititit hxy εμαβ +++= )(*
*
1
*   
 
                                                 
46  Individuals are asked to rate their health twice, the second time with an additional set of health 
related questions. They find there is about 28 percent change in their ratings and therefore it is 
reasonable to argue that self-assessed health is measured with error. 
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The measurement error in health status, itμ , will result in an attenuated 
estimate of health effect on supplementary health insurance holdings.  
To control the measurement error problem of the self-reported health 
status, using instrumental variables is the most commonly proposed method in the 
literature and econometric textbooks. However, finding the right instrumental 
variables is a hard task not only because they must satisfy the strict econometric 
conditions but also because they must be available in empirical data. Up to now, 
we find that most of the studies involving self-reported health status from GSOEP 
do not control for measurement error. Knaus and Nuscheler (2002) examine the 
effect of health on the probability of changing of health insurance with the 
GSOEP data from 1995 to 2000. They adopt a simultaneous two equation system 
in their empirical estimation. Self-reported health status is collapsed from 5 to 2 
categories, good or bad, and then is estimated by a couple of control variables, 
such as doctor visits, hospital stay, long periods of absence from work due to 
illness, and other control variables are also included such as age, gender, and 
income. They use a Bivariate Probit model that jointly estimates health status and 
changes in health insurance. First, they estimate health status with ordinary probit 
and then the fitted values are used in a transition equation which is again 
estimated with ordinary probit. While the effects of health become significant 
with this approach, we suspect that the measures (doctor visits, hospital stay, long 
periods of absence from work due to illness) in their empirical model are not 
efficient in controlling for measurement error as these variables are more likely to 
be related to the decision to change health insurance. Furthermore, their empirical 
model which ignores the panel structure might yield incorrect estimates.  
I find more objective measures of own health in GSOEP but they are only 
available in wave 2002 and 2004. The respondents were asked to describe their 
health status in daily activities such as whether they have trouble climbing stairs, 
whether they have difficulties dressing alone, whether it is difficult or they need 
help getting in and out of bed, whether they need help with shopping, whether 
they have difficulties doing housework alone. They were also asked to report their 
mental and physical health in last four weeks such as whether they are stressed out, 
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whether they are melancholy, whether they have some physical pain, whether they 
achieved less due to mental health or whether they are limited socially due to 
health. These variables could be used as instruments as they are correlated with 
self-rated health in such a way that they affect respondents’ reference point when 
they report their health status during interview, but are uncorrelated with the error 
term in holding supplementary health insurance. A similar approach of modelling 
health status can be found in Bound et al. (1999). They use the detailed health 
information available from the Health and Retirement Survey to instrument for 
the endogenous and error-ridden self-reported health status. The predicted values 
are used as proxies in analyzing the labour market behaviour in the latter part of 
working life. 
The empirical model I use to control for measurement error in self-
reported health status consists of two equations in panel format:47 
 
(1)   itititit zxh 1111
* εαβ ++=  
(2)   itititit hxy 2
*
222
* εαβ ++=  
 
The first equation models the individual self-reported health status. Latent 
true health, denoted by *ith , is estimated by a set of objective health measures itz , 
such as the daily activity indicators. itx1  is a set of exogenous variables including 
age, gender and income, etc.  
The set of exogenous variables in Equation (2) contains some variables 
that do not appear in Equation (1). In equation (2), itx2  is a set of control variables 
such as the personal characteristics (age, sex, education), family background 
(married or single, number of children), social status (income, type of job, 
foreigner, a dummy for West Germany), insurance type (in AOK, or BKK, or 
other funds, whether the individual has compulsory insurance, voluntary 
insurance, family co-insurance, or insurance as a pensioner, unemployed person 
                                                 
47 I do find (as shown in the empirical results section) the estimates are quite different between 
panel models and the models simply pooling observations.  
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or student), whether he has changed health insurance in previous year, his 
disability status, his willingness to take health risks, and his health care utilization 
in the previous year.  
The nonlinear model controlling for measurement error given by 
Equations (1) and (2) in principle can be estimated by a two-stage maximum 
likelihood procedure. First, health status in Equation (1) is estimated by an 
Ordered Probit. Second, the fitted values of health status from the first step are 
used in the structural Equation (2). The estimation of the structural equation is 
again obtained by using a random effect panel probit model (when the dependent 
variable is a dummy) and a random effect panel tobit model (when the dependent 
variable is a quantity). Because I use predicted values of health status, the 
estimated standard errors in the second stage are incorrect. I apply a bootstrap 
technique, which takes into account the panel structure to correct standard 
errors.48 Due to the complexity of the estimation technique, I ignore the potential 
correlation across time between the errors terms, itε  and between measurement 
errors, itμ .  
In addition to the empirical models of probability and quantity purchased 
of supplementary health insurance, I model the supplementary contract that covers 
hospital stays. As the data is missing for those who do not have supplementary 
health insurance, the Heckman selection model is applied. In this case, the model 
of our interest is: 
 
(3)   itititit hxy 3
*
333
*
2 εαβ ++=  
 
where *2ity  is the unobserved latent variable denoting the status of holding 
supplementary health insurance covering hospital stays. In our data we observe 
ity2 , which is a dummy that takes on a value of 1 or 0. 
                                                 
48 My estimation strategy of using health proxies in the second step is similar to Bound et al. 
(1999). In addition, I use bootstraping to adjust the standard error in the second step. 
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I then add a selection equation to our model of interest, which is 
essentially the observed status of having supplementary health insurance:  
 
(4)   [ ]01 2*2221 ≥++= itititit hxy εαβ  
 
when ity1 =1 we observe ity2 , otherwise we do not. My estimation strategy is to 
use the fitted values of health status in Equation (3) and apply the Heckman 
selection model. The standard errors are bootstrapped. The potential correlation 
between the errors terms across time is ignored. I perform the test of sample 
selection bias in Equation (3) as well. 
 
IV. Data and Descriptive Statistics 
Our data source is German Socio-Economic Panel Studies (GSOEP). 
GSOEP was started in 1984 as a longitudinal survey of private households and 
persons aged 18 years and older in the Federal Republic of Germany. It collects a 
rich array of information such as individual characteristics, social backgrounds, 
economic status, religions, personal opinions and attitudes toward some specific 
topics, etc. The original sample includes 4,528 households and all the full-age 
members in each household.  In later years various refreshment samples were 
added. For example, in June 1990, 2,179 households from former German 
Democratic Republic (GDR) were included immediately after the reunion. In 
1998, a refreshment sample of 1,067 households was added and in year 2000, 
6,052 additional households were added.  
As this micro data panel provides extensive information on the individual 
characteristics which are needed to analyze health and health insurance choice in 
Germany, my purpose is to explore this information to analyze the holdings of 
supplementary health insurance. The issues of interest include the characteristics 
of those who are more likely to have supplementary health insurance, whether the 
 
 82
story of adverse selection applies to the demand for supplementary health 
insurance in Germany, and whether there is risk selection in the provision of 
supplementary health insurance which results in market inefficiency.  
The subjects studied in this chapter are all publicly insured individuals. As 
mentioned in the introduction, the majority of Germans are covered by the social 
health insurance. Since health care reforms in recent decades slashed more and 
more services and benefits provided by social health insurance, a growing 
proportion of the publicly insured members started looking for supplementary 
health insurance in the private health insurance market.  
Figure 3.1 gives a picture of the supplementary health insurance trend 
from 1996 to 2005 in our data source. The percentage of supplementary health 
insurance holdings among the publicly insured has been increasing over this 10-
year period. In 1996 it was about 4 percent and in 2005, it reached at around 13 
percent. Over time the market for supplementary health insurance is expanding. 
Figure 3.2 provides a more detailed picture about supplementary 
coverage. 49  Among the five categories of hospital stay, dental care, eye and 
corrective devices, travelling abroad, and others,50 we can see that hospital stays 
are more frequently demanded than the rest. My reasoning is that hospital 
expenses are a large portion of household expenses once a family member has to 
get in-patient treatment, and therefore the household is more willing to insure 
against its financial threat.  
Table 3.1 reports the summary statistics of variables used both in 
Equations (1) and (2) and the variables additionally used in Equations (1) and (2). 
I restrict the sample to the population between age 20 and 80, and I select waves 
2002 and 2004 due to the availability of objective health-related information.  
 The average age is around 47 years. Fifty-three percent of the sample are 
females. The average education is 11 years and the mean household pre-tax 
income is 39590 Euro. I use household income instead of the individual income 
since the decision to purchase supplementary health insurance within the 
                                                 
49 The period is from 1999 to 2005 as detailed coverage information was first available in 1999. 
50 This category includes the supplementary coverage for seeing medical practioners, which is not 
included in the usual health insurance contract.   
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household is more likely to depend on household financial ability. Around 8 
percent of the sample is unemployed. Eleven percent reported having disability 
status. The average doctor visits in the previous year are around 10 times per year 
and the average hospital nights in previous year are around 1.66. Two percent 
reported that they incurred the out-of-pocket expenses for visiting doctors, 
therapists or non-medical practitioners in 2002. Around 3 percent employed 
reported that they were sick from work for more than six weeks at least once in 
the previous year. The average risk measure of an individual’s willingness to take 
health risks is around 3.85 out of 11-point scale (where the willingness is 
increasing along the points). In general, the surveyed respondents are more risk 
averse with respect to health.  
 Among the additional variables used in the health status model are more 
objective health measures. I construct the individual’s BMI out of their body 
weight and height and then classify them into three categories: underweight, 
normal and obese. Around 2 percent is underweight and 15 percent is obese in our 
data. Smoking is also included as it is a negative indicator of health status. The 
detailed physical and mental health information 4 weeks prior to the interview are 
categorical variables ranging from 1 (very often happened) to 5 (never happened). 
The particular health situation of a respondent might affect his reference point as 
how he rated his health status. 
I examine in the empirical model three dependent variables of interest: a 
dummy for holding supplementary health insurance, the amount of supplementary 
health insurance (left truncated from 0 to a maximum of 800 Euro), and a dummy 
indicating hospital stay supplementary coverage. I include as explanatory 
variables insurance status that indicates whether an individual is a compulsory 
member (whose income is under a certain level) or a voluntary paying member, 
whether he has co-insurance as a family member or is insured as pensioner, 
whether he is unemployed, etc. I add controls for AOK and BKK as well. AOK 
(Allgemeine Ortskrankenkassen) plays a special role in the public health 
insurance system as it has to provide services to anyone who needs to be insured 
and not a member of other public sickness funds. Moreover, AOK mainly insures 
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blue collar workers who tend to bear a higher risk. BKK (Betriebskrankenkassen) 
is a company-based sickness fund and has, on average, lower contribution rates 
than all other funds. Consequently the adverse selection would result in more 
healthy insured in BKK.51 I also include an indicator for whether the individual 
changed his health insurance provider in the previous year.  
 I define four age groups: the first group consists of individuals between 
ages 20 and 29, the second group consists of those between 30 and 56 (prime 
working age), the third group consists of those between 57 to 65 (pre-retirement 
age) and the fourth group consists of those older than 65.  
Figure 3.3 presents the self-reported health status and the holdings of 
supplementary health insurance among different age groups. It is not surprising to 
see that self-reported health status diminishes among higher age groups. A higher 
proportion of the second and third group have supplementary health insurance 
than the other two groups. Despite its worse health status the group older than 65 
has lower purchases of supplementary coverage because either the premium is too 
high to offset the benefits, or applications are rejected by the profit-maximizing 
private insurance companies.  
Figure 3.4 presents a picture of the relationship between satisfaction with 
own health and the purchase of supplementary health insurance by the five 
categories of self-reported health status. Satisfaction with own health and the self-
reported health status are no doubt positively related, as the connected line shows. 
The bar chart shows the percentage purchasing supplementary coverage by health 
status. It shows that healthier individuals are more likely to have supplementary 
health insurance. For example, 12 percent of the individuals who report excellent 
health have supplementary coverage, compared with 6 percent of the individuals 
who reported being bad health. While the theory of adverse selection suggests that 
low-risk consumers consume less insurance, that is not the phenomenon we 
observe here. One explanation I can offer is that private health insurance 
companies have access to applicant’s data through hospitals and gatekeepers 
                                                 
51 As concluded by Knaus and Nuscheler (2002). 
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(family doctors), which results in a market with less asymmetric information, 
mitigating the adverse selection problem.  
Figure 3.5 shows the distribution of health status and the purchase of 
supplementary health insurance by 4 income quartiles. The first income quartile is 
the lowest 25 percent, and the fourth one is the highest 25 percent. From the left 
panel, we could see that individuals with higher family incomes were more like to 
report good health, while those with lower family income were more like to report 
bad health. There exists a positive relationship between income and health status, 
which could be interpreted as those with higher incomes are able to obtain more 
resources that can be allocated to health production and therefore have improved 
health.52 This is in line with health production theory. The right panel shows a 
positive relationship between purchasing supplementary health insurance and 
income in general. The purchases within a quartile are stratified by different 
health status as well. For example, the first income quartile displays a pattern of 
higher levels of insurance purchase by healthier individuals. The second income 
quartile is more homogenous in holdings. The holdings of supplementary health 
insurance among the fourth income quartile is more concentrated among those 
who report a health status of excellent, good, satisfactory or poor. Combining both 
panels, the story from our data tell us that the poor are often in poorer health and 
do not have sufficient insurance coverage against health risks, which puts a high 
financial burden on them once the expensive health cost is incurred.  
 
V. Empirical Findings 
A. Baseline model 
Table 3.2 shows results from the basic model (Eq.1a) for wave 2002 and 
2004. I restrict the sample to individuals in both waves and therefore it is a 
balanced panel. I use the original self-reported health status to examine its effect 
on supplementary health insurance holdings.  The random effect panel probit 
model controls for age, gender, education, marital status, number of children at 
                                                 
52 The causality could be the other way around, i.e., the healthy are more productive in labour 
market and are able to earn higher income. 
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home, pre-tax household income, job status-white collar, blue collar, self-
employed, or health related job, unemployed, self-reported health status, AOK or 
BKK member, insurance status, disability status, doctor visits, hospital nights and 
illness longer than 6 weeks last year, West German, foreigner, year dummy, and 
interaction between income quartiles and health status. In general, the holdings of 
supplementary health insurance are increasing for higher age groups but the 
increase is smaller in the oldest age group. Higher income is related to the higher 
holdings of supplementary health insurance.  
The main variable I am concerned with is self-reported health status, 
which is negatively related to insurance holdings (better health is related to higher 
probability of holdings) but is statistically insignificant. This estimate is subject to 
bias due to the measurement error as discussed in the previous section. In the 
following sections, I instrument this variable with some additional information 
available in wave 2002 and 2004. 
 
B. Health status equation 
To start I calculate a Smith-Blundell test statistic for exogeneity after a 
simple probit model. 53 In the Smith-Blundell test, the null hypothesis states that 
the models are appropriately specified and all explanatory variables as exogenous. 
Under the alternative hypothesis, the suspected endogenous variable, self-reported 
health status, is expressed as a linear projection of a set of instruments, and the 
residuals from the first-stage regressions are added to the model. The residuals 
should have no explanatory power under the null and are included in the probit 
model. The test statistic is distributed Chi-squared (m), where m is the number of 
explanatory variables specified as endogenous in the model. I obtain a Smith-
Blundell test statistic of 6.17, which is distributed as Chi-squared (1) with a P-
value of one percent. Therefore I can reject the exogeneity of the self-reported 
health status and conclude that some work must be done to yield unbiased 
estimates of the effect of health. 
                                                 
53See Smith and Blundell (1986) 
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Table 3.3 reports the estimates of an Ordered Probit model of health status. 
I regress self-reported health status on a set of explanatory variables. First, the 
demographic variables appear to be significant in explaining health status. Higher 
age groups are associated with worse health status. Females are less likely to 
reported bad health. Married individuals are more likely to report bad health. 
Education year, however, appears to be statistically insignificant.54 Higher income 
is positively related to better health outcomes, possibly due to the fact that more 
economic resources can be allocated to health production55 (such as a healthier 
diet, sports equipment, better quality health care, etc.). Being unemployed is 
related to worse health, which confirms the detrimental effects of unemployment 
on health found in recent studies. Disability and being sick for longer than 6 
weeks in the previous year are important indicators of health status. Health care 
utilization such as doctor visits and hospital nights in the previous year is 
positively related to worse health, as is out-of-pocket health expenditures. Being 
active in sports is defined as doing sports as least once a week. This variable turns 
out to be positively related to health outcomes. Smoking is positively related to 
poor health as expected. A higher body mass index (BMI) is associated with poor 
health, as indicated by the coefficient on obesity.  Another set of variables which 
indicates certain physical or mental health conditions in the last four weeks prior 
to the interview are found to significantly influence an individual’s reference 
point as to how they view their health status. For example, if the respondent was 
under stress in the last four weeks, he tended to report worse health status. 
Furthermore, the variables indicating whether an individual has trouble in daily 
tasks such as climbing up the stairs, dressing up, getting in/out of bed, shopping, 
doing housework alone, are positively related to worse health outcomes as well.   
 
C. Supplementary Health Insurance Equation 
I model the dependent variable-- holding of supplementary health 
insurance as a dummy - and estimate a random effect panel probit model with 
                                                 
54 Using a dummy that indicates the level of education does not change the results.  
55 There can be reverse causality in the relationship as well if the healthy individuals are more 
productive in the labour market. 
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self-reported health status replaced by the fitted values from health status equation. 
The standard errors are bootstrapped. Table 3.4 provides the estimation results. 
The coefficients indicate positive or negative effects of the independent variables 
on the insurance probability.  
The predicted health status turns out to be statistically significant at the 
one percent level and the effect becomes larger than when using the actual self-
reported health status variable (-0.142 vs. -0.073). Measurement error in self-
reported health status leads a downward bias. The estimation results show that the 
respondents in worse health status are less likely to have supplementary health 
insurance. It proves the existence of risk selection in the private insurance market 
for supplementary coverage. Through full access of a patient’s record, the insurers 
select healthier individuals and leave the comparatively unhealthy out in order to 
optimize their risk structure. As the actual rejection rate is greater than zero, the 
equilibrium we observe is less than optimal.   
The willingness to take health risks is positively and significantly related 
to supplementary health insurance holdings. However, it should not be interpreted 
as evidence of adverse selection because this variable is not equivalent to actual 
health status. In the health status equation, it turns out that the willingness to take 
health risks is insignificant in predicting health status. Furthermore, it is health 
status (not willingness to take health risks) which indicates the actual risk type to 
the insurers. While willingness to take health risks can capture the individual 
heterogeneity in the panel dataset, I also consider the possibility that the positive 
coefficient reflects reverse causality, i.e., the individual becomes more willing to 
take health risks after the purchase of supplementary health insurance.   
Health care utilization such as doctor visits and out-of-pocket medical 
expenditures are positively related to the possibility of supplementary health 
insurance holdings. Other explanatory variable such as income is positively 
related to the holdings. Self-employed individuals are more likely to have 
supplementary health insurance, while the unemployed are less likely.  
In the second step I estimate how the quantity of the supplementary health 
insurance responds to the different factors. In the dataset, the quantity purchased 
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ranges between 0 and 800 Euro per year. Essentially this variable is left censored 
at zero. I apply a panel random effect tobit model to Equation (2) in the two step 
estimation and bootstrap the standard errors. The results are shown in Table 3.5. 
Among the total 30594 observations in our dataset, 2940 are uncensored and 
27654 are left-censored. The coefficients are not the marginal effects of the 
explanatory variables on amount of supplementary health insurance purchased, 
but instead the directions of their effects. In addition, I calculate in Table 3.5 the 
marginal effects on the conditional expectation and unconditional expectation, 
where the former is defined as  
 
jx
xyyE
∂
>∂ ),0(
,  
 
and the latter is defined as  
 
jx
xyE
∂
∂ )(
.  
 
Conditional on supplementary health insurance purchase being positive, 
the person who is older than 65 is estimated to spend about 8 Euros more on 
supplemental health insurance. If we account for people who initially do not have 
supplementary health insurance, as well as those who have the positive purchase, 
the marginal effect of this age group dummy is about 12 Euros, which is larger 
than when we condition on a positive purchase. Income turns out to be positively 
related to the quantity purchased. The individual in the 4th income quartile on 
average spends around 13 Euros (unconditional marginal effect) more than their 
counterpart in the lowest income quartile. The self employed spend more on 
supplementary health insurance and the unemployed spend significantly less. The 
negative marginal effects of predicted health status tell us that people in poor 
health have less supplementary health insurance, which is consistent with the 
previous results. The willingness to take health related risks is positively related to 
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the quantity purchased. Again this variable underlines the individual’s rational 
behaviour in seeking optimal protection with prior knowledge of his own risk type. 
Among the indicators of health care utilization, previous doctor visits turn out to 
be statistically significant and for every 10 visits are supposed to increase the 
conditional marginal purchase about 0.23 Euros and the unconditional marginal 
purchase about 0.5 Euros. The positive out-of-pocket medical expense, as well as 
whether the individual is sick for longer than 6 weeks in previous year increases 
the purchase as well. Germans, especially West Germans on average, purchase 
more supplementary health insurance than others.  
 Table 3.6 shows the estimates of the supplementary health insurance, 
which covers hospital stays using a Heckman Selection Probit model. As 
discussed earlier, hospital expenditures comprise not only the largest part of 
national health care costs but also impose a great impact on the financial status of 
an individual. The incentive to purchase additional coverage for hospital stays 
from private health insurance companies is greater than other kinds of coverage. I 
use a Heckman selection model because we only observe the status of having 
additional coverage of hospital stays among those who have supplementary health 
insurance. For those who do not have supplementary health insurance, this 
information is missing. If we set the value of the missing information to zero and 
estimate the whole sample, then we will underestimate the effect. If we restrict the 
sample to those who have supplementary health insurance, we will overestimate 
the effect.  The test for selection bias in the regression yields a significant value of 
17.04, which indicates that sample selection bias is present.  
The evidence of risk selection is well illustrated by the negative coefficient 
on health status in Table 3.6. The marginal effects are calculated from the 
conditional probability, i.e., conditional on the positive purchase of supplementary 
health insurance. An integer-point increase in the predicted health status (health is 
worse) is associated with 3 percent decrease in the probability of having 
supplementary health insurance, which covers hospital stays.  
 
VI. Conclusion 
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This chapter examines the driving forces behind the holding of 
supplementary health insurance in Germany. Controlling for measurement errors, 
I mainly focus on the effect of health status on the status and quantity of holdings, 
as well as contracts covering hospital stays.  
The results in this chapter find no evidence of adverse selection and 
instead confirm the existence of risk selection in private health insurance market 
for supplementary coverage. Not only those who are in poor financial status but 
also those who are in worse health status are more likely to be left without 
supplementary coverage.  The current system which enables private health 
insurance companies to have full access to patient’s data could explain the 
existence of risk selection. This is well illustrated from the empirical results that 
worse health status is negatively related to the holding of supplementary health 
insurance, especially with the coverage of hospital stays. The market provision of 
supplementary health insurance is not efficient in the sense that not all individuals 
who need supplementary coverage can purchase the contract in the private health 
insurance market.  
These results have implications on the current debate regarding patients’ 
data protection. If risk selection prevents consumers from maximizing utility in 
the presence of health uncertainty, a specific policy favouring consumers’ access 
to supplementary health insurance could improve market efficiency.  
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Figure 3.1: Purchase of Supple. Health Insurance 
              among Compulsory Insured 
 
Source: German Socio-economic Panel Studies (1996-2005), author’s self calculation. 
 
 
Figure 3.2: Purchase of Supplementary Health Insurance  
With Different Coverage 
 
 
Source: German Socio-economic Panel Studies (1999-2005), author’s self calculation. 
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Figure 3.3: Self-reported Health Status, Purchase of Supplementary  
Health Insurance among Different Age Groups 
 
 
 
Source: German Socio-economic Panel Studies (wave 2002 and wave 2004) 
Note:  age group 1: age between 20 to 29 
age group 2: age between 30 to 56 
 age group 3: age between 57 to 65 
age group 4: age greater than 65 
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Figure 3.4: Satisfaction with Health, Purchase of Supplementary Health 
Insurance by 5 Categories of Health Status 
 
 
 
Source: German Socio-economic Panel Studies (wave 2002 and wave 2004) 
Note:  self-reported health status  --1: excellent,  
    --2: good, 
    --3: satisfactory 
    --4: poor 
    --5: bad 
 
 
 95
Figure 3.5: Distribution of Self-reported Health Status and Purchase of  
         Supplementary Health Insurance by Income Quartile 
 
 
Source: German Socio-economic Panel Studies (wave 2002 and wave 2004) 
Note: income quartile -1: household pre-tax income first 25 percentile  
 -2: household pre-tax income between 25 and 50 percentile 
 -3: household pre-tax income between 50 and 75 percentile 
 -4: household pre-tax income above 75 percentile 
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Table 3.1: Summary Statistics of Variables 
 
Variables used both  in health status and supplementary HI model 
Variable Mean Std. dev. Min Max 
Age 47.10 15.70 20 79 
Female 0.53 0.50 0 1 
Education 11.46 3.08 0 18 
Married 0.66 0.47 0 1 
Number of kids 0.56 0.92 0 9 
Household pre-tax incomea 39.59 41.39 0 1449.41 
White-collar 0.32 0.46 0 1 
Civil servant 0.01 0.08 0 1 
Self-employed 0.04 0.20 0 1 
Unemployed 0.08 0.27 0 1 
Disability 0.11 0.31 0 1 
Willing to take health risks 3.85 2.43 1 11 
Doctor visits last year 9.88 16.27 0 360 
# hospital nights last year 1.66 7.96 0 275 
Medical expense in 2002 0.02 0.15 0 1 
Sick longer than 6 weeks last year 0.03 0.18 0 1 
Additional variables used in health status model Eq.(2) 
Active in sport 0.33 0.47 0 1 
Underweightb 0.02 0.14 0 1 
Obeseb 0.15 0.36 0 1 
Smoke 0.32 0.47 0 1 
The followings occurred in last 4 weeksc 
Under stress 3.14 1.08 1 5 
Melancholy, run-down 3.51 1.00 1 5 
Well balanced 2.62 0.89 1 5 
Use lots of energy 2.91 0.90 1 5 
Physical pain 3.87 1.09 1 5 
Achieved less due to physical health 3.87 1.09 1 5 
Limited due to physical health 3.94 1.10 1 5 
Achieved less due to mental health 4.15 0.99 1 5 
Less thoroughly due to mental health 4.29 0.96 1 5 
(to be continued) 
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Whether having trouble in 
Climbing stairs 0.40 0.49 0 1 
Dressing 0.01 0.09 0 1 
Getting in/out of bed 0.00 0.06 0 1 
Shopping 0.01 0.11 0 1 
Doing housework alone 0.01 0.10 0 1 
Additional variables used in supplementary HI model Eq(3) 
Having supplementary HI 0.12 0.32 0 1 
Amount of supplementary HI 5.08 24.11 0 800 
Supplementary HI covers 
Hospital stay 0.09 0.28 0 1 
Corrective device (e.g, glasses) 0.04 0.19 0 1 
Dentures 0.05 0.23 0 1 
Coverage abroad 0.04 0.20 0 1 
Others 0.02 0.13 0 1 
Insurance status 
Compulsory paying member 0.53 0.50 0 1 
Voluntary paying member 0.12 0.32 0 1 
Co-insured as family member 0.13 0.33 0 1 
Insured as pensioner, unemployed, etc. 0.22 0.41 0 1 
 
Health status 2.62 0.95 1 5 
AOK member 0.33 0.47 0 1 
BKK member 0.20 0.40 0 1 
Changing health insurance last year 0.06 0.23 0 1 
Year 2004 0.48 0.50 0 1 
West German 0.745 0.44 0 1 
German 0.92 0.29 0 1 
Total observations 30594 
 
Data source: GSOEP 2002 and 2004 wave.  
Note:  a) in 1,000 euro. 
 b) underweight – BMI is less than  18.5; obese – BMI is greater than 30. 
 c) these categorical variables range from 1 (very often) to 5 (never). 
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Table 3.2: Panel Random Effect Probit Model of Supplementary 
Health Insurance Holdings 
 
Supple. HI (dummy) Coefficient Prob>z 
Age groups:  based group -- age between 20 and 29  
Age between 30 to 56 0,292 0,006 
Age between 57 to 65 0,495 0,000 
Age greater than 65 0,621 0,000 
Female 0,242 0,001 
Education 0,102 0,000 
Married  0,074 0,350 
Number of Children -0,142 0,000 
Income quartiles: base group -- 1st income quartile 
2nd income quartile 0,704 0,000 
3rd income quartile 0,908 0,000 
4th income quartile 1,295 0,000 
White-collar 0,036 0,680 
Blue-collar -0,313 0,002 
Self-employed 0,429 0,003 
Unemployed -0,341 0,006 
Self-reported Health Status  -0,073 0,173 
Willing to take health risks 0,056 0,000 
Disability  -0,092 0,397 
Doctor visits last year 0,002 0,140 
# hospital nights last year 0,000 0,919 
Medical expense in 2002 0,301 0,134 
Sick longer than 6 weeks last year 0,283 0,028 
AOK  member -0,826 0,000 
BKK member -0,080 0,309 
 
(to be continued) 
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Insurance status: base group--Compulsory paying member 
Co-insured as family member -0,131 0,198 
Insured as pensioner, unemployed, etc. -0,380 0,000 
Voluntary paying member 0,229 0,006 
Changed HI provider last year 0,131 0,159 
West German 1,133 0,000 
German 1,291 0,000 
Year 2004 0,184 0,000 
Total Observations 30594 
Wald chi2(35)       822.74 
Log likelihood   -8112.4985                     
 
Data source: GSOEP data Wave 2002 and 2004.  
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Table 3.3: Ordered Probit Model of Health Status 
 
Health status Coefficient Prob>z 
Age groups:  based group -- age between 20 and 29  
Age between 30 to 56 0,383 0,000 
Age between 57 to 65 0,588 0,000 
Age greater than 65 0,663 0,000 
Female -0,092 0,000 
Education -0,003 0,859 
Married  0,054 0,001 
Income quartiles: base group -- 1st income quartile 
2nd income quartile -0,071 0,001 
3rd income quartile -0,081 0,001 
4th income quartile -0,102 0,000 
Unemployed 0,149 0,000 
Willingness to take health risks -0,001 0,816 
Disability  0,318 0,000 
Doctor visits last year 0,011 0,000 
# hospital nights last year 0,010 0,000 
Sick longer than 6 weeks last year 0,217 0,000 
Medical expense in 2002 0,152 0,000 
Active in sport -0,146 0,000 
Underweight 0,046 0,352 
Obese 0,101 0,000 
Smoke 0,089 0,000 
The followings occurred in last 4 weeks 
Under stress  0,017 0,024 
     Melancholy, run-down -0,109 0,000 
Well balanced  0,077 0,000 
Use lots of energy  0,265 0,000 
Physical pain -0,329 0,000 
Achieved less due to physical health -0,087 0,000 
Limited due to physical health -0,177 0,000 
Achieved less due to mental health 0,025 0,013 
Less thoroughly due to mental health -0,042 0,000 
 (to be continued) 
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Whether having trouble in 
Climbing stairs 0,488 0,000 
Dressing  0,278 0,043 
Getting in/out of bed 0,489 0,008 
Shopping 0,148 0,272 
Doing housework alone 0,287 0,058 
Total Observations 30594 
Log likelihood   -28830,431 
 
Data source: GSOEP data wave 2002 and wave 2004.  
Note: other controls includes: four job type: blue collar, white collar, self-employed, health 
related job. Their coefficients are all statistically insignificant at the level of 10%. 
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Table 3.4: Panel Random Effect Probit Model of Supplementary 
Health Insurance Holdings 
 
Supple. HI (dummy) Coefficient 
Bootstrapped  
Std. Errors 
Age groups: based group -- age between 20 and 29  
Age between 30 to 56 0,348 0,107 
Age between 57 to 65 0,586 0,132 
Age greater than 65 0,735 0,158 
Female 0,244 0,074 
Education 0,098 0,013 
Married  0,090 0,079 
Number of Children -0,139 0,039 
Income quartiles: base group -- 1st income quartile 
2nd income quartile 0,694 0,115 
3rd income quartile 0,893 0,127 
4th income quartile 1,266 0,132 
White-collar 0,029 0,085 
Blue-collar -0,313 0,103 
Self-employed 0,418 0,145 
Unemployed -0,312 0,123 
Health Status (Predicted) -0,142 0,036 
Willing to take health risks 0,057 0,014 
Disability  0,006 0,113 
Doctor visits last year 0,005 0,002 
# hospital nights last year 0,001 0,004 
Medical expense in 2002 0,326 0,205 
Sick longer than 6 weeks last year 0,328 0,130 
AOK  member -0,823 0,083 
BKK member -0,081 0,079 
 
(to be continued) 
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Insurance status: base group--Compulsory paying member 
Co-insured as family member -0,128 0,101 
Insured as pensioner, unemployed, etc. -0,380 0,089 
Voluntary paying member 0,235 0,082 
Changed HI provider last year 0,134 0,093 
West German 1,127 0,088 
German 1,294 0,165 
Year 2004 0,185 0,035 
Total Observations 30594 
Wald chi2(35)       822.29 
Log likelihood   -8105.7231                     
 
Data source: GSOEP data wave 2002 and wave 2004.  
Note: other controls includes: interaction between 4 income quartiles and health status 
(collapsed into good and bad two categories). 
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Table 3.5: Panel Random Effect Tobit Model of Amount 
Supplementary Health Insurance Holdings 
 
Supple. HI (quantity) Coefficient
Marg. effect on 
Conditional 
Expectation
Marg. effect on 
Unconditional 
Expectation 
Age groups:  based group -- age between 20 and 29  
Age between 30 to 56 18,157*** 1,267*** 2,751*** 
Age between 57 to 65 48,298*** 4,595*** 7,998*** 
Age greater than 65 70,062*** 8,002*** 12,394*** 
Female 10,037*** 0,693*** 1,502*** 
Education 3,986*** 0,281*** 0,606*** 
Married  4,531* 0,303* 0,662* 
Number of Children -4,947*** -0,338*** -0,730*** 
Income quartiles: base group -- 1st income quartile 
2nd income quartile 41,805*** 3,997*** 7,345*** 
3rd income quartile 45,805*** 4,825*** 8,625*** 
4th income quartile 68,144*** 8,275*** 13,308*** 
White-collar -5,877* -0,397** -0,868* 
Blue-collar -20,213*** -1,283*** -3,001*** 
Self-employed 19,690*** 1,658*** 3,168*** 
Unemployed -13,774*** -0,877*** -2,047*** 
Health Status (Predicted) -5,618*** -0,425*** -0,919*** 
Willing to take health risks 2,007*** 0,137*** 0,296*** 
Disability  4,273 0,374 0,787 
Doctor visits last year 0,318*** 0,023*** 0,049*** 
# hospital nights last year -0,221 -0,014 -0,030 
Medical expense in 2002 18,675*** 1,506*** 2,898*** 
Sick longer than 6 weeks last year 14,026** 1,030** 2,051** 
AOK  member -33,464*** -2,126*** -4,903*** 
 
(to be continued) 
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BKK member -6,728*** -0,446*** -0,989*** 
West German 52,381*** 2,985*** 7,434*** 
German 47,019*** 2,315*** 6,409*** 
Year 2004 4,678** 0,327** 0,705** 
Insurance status--controlled 
Total Observations 30594 
Wald chi2(35)       822.29 
Log likelihood   -8105.7231                     
 
Data source: GSOEP data wave 2002 and wave 2004.  
Note:   Marginal effect on Conditional Expectation is defined as jxxyyE ∂>∂ ),0(  
Marginal effect on Unconditional Expectation is defined as jxxyE ∂∂ )(  
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Table 3.6: Heckman Selection Model of Supplementary Health  
Insurance Covering Hospital Stay 
 
Supple. HI – Hospital (dummy) Coefficient Marginal effect
Age groups:  based group -- age between 20 and 29  
Age between 30 to 56 0,158** 0,078** 
Age between 57 to 65 0,551*** 0,228*** 
Age greater than 65 0,600*** 0,252*** 
   
Female 0,038 0,030 
Health Status (Predicted) -0,063** -0,032*** 
Disability  -0,248*** -0,102*** 
Doctor visits last year -0,001 0,000 
# hospital nights last year 0,000 0,000 
Sick longer than 6 weeks last year 0,033 0,032 
AOK  member -0,114 -0,091*** 
BKK member -0,210*** -0,094*** 
Changed HI provider last year -0,133 -0,042 
West German 0,540*** 0,284*** 
German 0,034 0,081 
Year 2004 -0,112*** -0,036*** 
Total Observations 30594 
Uncensored Obs. 3553 
Wald chi2(35)       109.47 
Log likelihood   -11774.3                     
Wald test of rho=0 17.04 
 
Data source: GSOEP data wave 2002 and wave 2004.  
Note: marginal effect is calculated based on the conditional probability -- Pr(supple. HI covering 
hospital stay | having supple. HI) 
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